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Though often overlooked, unilateralism as a foreign policy approach deserves to 
be studied, even in the case of Canada, a country that has developed a reputation as a 
staunch defender of its opposite, multilateralism.  This thesis studies does precisely that, 
and is prompted, by a proposition recently put forward by Allan Gotlieb, the former 
Canadian Ambassador to the United States, that, when other methods have proven 
ineffective, unilateralism has been a very real option for Canada.  The thesis explores the 
validity of Gotliebs claim by examining three cases cited by Gotlieb as examples of a 
unilateral approach taken by Canada: the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act in 1970, 
its declaration of straight baselines around the Arctic Archipelago in 1985, and the so-
called Turbot War launched by enforcement of amendments to the Coastal Fisheries 
Protection Act in 1995.  Were these in fact cases of determined unilateralism, prompted 
as Gotlieb argues, by a basic need to defend the most basic of Canadas core interests, its 
territorial sovereignty?   
Further investigation of the cases cited by Gotlieb reveals that he is correct in one 
sense but not in another.  In all of the cases Canada undeniably acted unilaterally.  But 
Gotliebs analysis misses the larger reality that the three initiatives were pursued within a 
framework of multilateralism.  Canada acted unilaterally not simply for the purpose of 
protecting Canadas territorial integrity, but in the hopes of reinvigorating a multilateral 
process.   
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Unilateralism is . . . a lot easier to work than genuine multilateralism 
and it is . . . not, in all circumstances, [a] sin.1 
 
 Brilliantly simple, John Holmes observation suggests to us that unilateralism as a 
foreign policy approach deserves to be studied, even in the case of Canada, a country that 
has developed a reputation as a staunch defender of its opposite, multilateralism.  This 
thesis does precisely that, and is prompted, in particular, by a proposition recently put 
forward by Allan Gotlieb, the former Canadian Ambassador to the United States, that, 
when other methods have proven ineffective, unilateralism has been a very real option for 
Canada.  Gotlieb argues that writers have paid far too little attention to the reality that 
Canada has not infrequently resorted to unilateralism as a foreign policy approach and 
with considerable effect.  In his words: when it comes to pursuing our national 
interest, Canada has a long history of unilateralism.  Even if we have a multilateralist 
chromosome, when our territory or sovereignty is at stake, there is a zest for unilateralism 
in our genes. 2  
The goal of the thesis is to explore the validity of Gotliebs claim that Canada has 
a preference to acting unilaterally to protect its territory by examining three cases that he 
himself cites as examples under three different Prime Ministers: its enactment under 
Pierre Trudeau of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act in 1970, its declaration 
under Brian Mulroney of straight baselines around the Arctic Archipelago in 1985, and 
the so-called Turbot War launched by the Jean Chrétien government in 1995.  Were these 
in fact cases of determined unilateralism, prompted as Gotlieb argues, by a basic need to 
defend the most basic of Canadas core interests, its territorial sovereignty?  This is the 
central question to be answered. 
                                                
1 John Homes, The New Agenda for Canadian Internationalism, Canada and the New Internationalism, 
eds. John Holmes and John Kirton (Toronto: Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1988), 13. 
2 Allan Gotlieb, Realism and Romanticism in Canadas Foreign Policy, (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 
2004), 33. 
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Unilateralism deserves some kind of definition.  Unfortunately, many of the 
definitions were written in the context of the Cold War.  As a result, they often addressed 
unilateralism in relation to nuclear disarmament, where countries were encouraged to 
unilaterally announce the destruction of their nuclear weapons.3  Since the end of the 
Cold War, with the emergence of the United States (US) as the major global power, new 
definitions of unilateralism have developed negative connotations.  Unilateralism is 
largely used pejoratively to describe the US acting by itself and then coerc[ing] others to 
fall in line.4  What this definition fails to articulate is that states other than the US 
frequently operate unilaterally and do so for legitimate reasons.  They simply choose not 
to describe their behaviour as unilateral because of the off-putting impressions associated 
with it.  As one author says, unilateralism often seems tantamount to a dirty word.5  
Perhaps because of the different implications associated with unilateralism, there is no 
widely accepted definition.6 
   Still, unilateralism must be defined for the purposes of the thesis.  A workable 
definition comes from Daniel Bodansky, who defines unilateralism as one state 
proceed[ing] independently, on its own authority, with minimal involvement by other 
states in the resulting decision or action.7  Writers have noted that there are varying 
degrees of unilateralism, which reflect the undeniable reality of a world that is used to 
operating multilaterally. 8  States will rarely take action in complete isolation.  Even great 
powers will consider the possible reactions of other major international players.9  Indeed 
it is unusual for a state to take unilateral action against another state without first 
attempting to negotiate or resolve differences. 10   
                                                
3 Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, Dictionary of International Relations, (Toronto: Penguin Books 
Canada Ltd., 1998), 550. 
4 Jay M. Shatritz, Phil Williams, and Ronald Calinge, The Dictionary of 20th Century World Politics, (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1993), 459. 
5 Daniel Bodansky, Whats so bad about unilateral action to Protect the Environment?  European Journal 
of International Law 11(2) (2000), 339. 
6 Bernhard Jansen, Limits of Unilateralism, European Journal of International Law 11(2) (2000),309. 
7 Bodansky, 340. 
8 Graham F. Walker, Introduction, Independence in an Age of Empire: Assessing Unilateralism and 
Multilateralism, ed. Graham F. Walker (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2004), 4-5. 
9 Bodansky, 342. 
10 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Place and Role of Unilateralism in Contemporary International Law, 
European Journal of International Law 11(2) (2000), 24. 
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One of the perhaps paradoxical features of unilateralism is that it can actually end 
up furthering the prospects of multilateralism.  It has been the case that states will act 
unilaterally to enforce or further the development of international norms.11  Where 
unilateralism arouses international condemnation, it tends to remind the international 
community that multilateral cooperation is viewed as desirable in international 
relations.12  
 On the other hand, states often find themselves acting unilaterally and for 
legitimate reasons.  At times, states are faced with a choice not between unilateralism and 
multilateralism, but between unilateralism and inaction.13  In fact states act unilaterally on 
a daily basis as governments implement policies, make decisions, and adopt 
administrative and other acts.14  In many cases, such actions will mainly affect only that 
particular state.  It is when they affect another state that they are sometimes criticized, 
most often by those affected by the action.15       
 Unilateralism is not a prevalent topic in the literature on Canadian foreign policy.  
On the contrary, the literature tends to focus on Canadas overwhelming tendency to act 
multilaterally or to operate within the context of multilateral institutions.  Authors who 
stress the prominence of multilateralism in Canadian foreign policy usually pay little 
attention to evident instances of unilateral behaviour.  They argue that multilateralism is 
not only the primary method used in Canadian foreign policy but the ideal one. 
 The literatures preoccupation with multilateralism, often equated with the 
broader concept of internationalism, is attributed to the influence of distinguished scholar 
John Holmes.16  For Holmes, multilateralism allowed states to pragmatically develop 
ways to solve problems; this was often the goal of foreign policy.  By acting 
multilaterally, states promoted ongoing discussion and dialogue in the international 
                                                
11 Sharitz et al., 682; Berridge and James, 266-267; and Bodansky, 340 and 343. 
12 Dupuy, 24. 
13 Bodansky, 339. 
14 Philippe Sands,  Unilateralism, Values, and International Law, European Journal of International 
Law 11(2) (2000), 292. 
15 Bodansky, 341and Jansen, 310. 
16 A good discussion of how the term internationalism is translated into multilateralism by Holmes and 
others is found in Don Muntons and Tom Keatings article, Internationalism and the Canadian Public, 
Canadian Journal of Political Science (September 2001), 517-549. 
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community and could work together to counterbalance the greater powers.17  When 
Holmes spoke of unilateralism, he was usually referring to unfortunate or ill-advised 
actions taken by larger powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union.  He did 
suggest that there is an appropriate and viable place for unilateralism in international 
relations: [unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism] each has its place  if only 
one can figure out what that is.18  But he was no advocate of unilateralism as a serious 
alternative diplomatic approach for Canada.  He was only prepared to admit that it might 
be necessary on an occasional basis, such as when Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau enacted 
the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act in 1970  an anomalous decision prompted 
by the domination of international law by large powers with special maritime and naval 
interests; this was a situation not likely to arise often.19   
Tom Keating has also written on the primacy of multilateralism in Canadian 
foreign policy.  Keating argues that over time and across different issues, Canadian 
policy makers have repeatedly relied on multilateralism in the pursuit of a diverse range 
of foreign policy objectives.20  Though he admits that Canada can use methods other 
than multilateralism, he maintains that the government in the [post-World War II] period 
had neither the will nor the capability to impose order on others in either the security or 
the economic realm.21  This tradition has continued and Canada still rel[ies] on 
multilateral strategies in the pursuit of foreign policy goals.22   
Yet scholars have, in recent times, started to concern themselves with 
unilateralism as a genuine feature of Canadian foreign policy.  These studies proceed 
largely from the standpoint of power analysis and the premise that Canada is a significant 
actor in the international system.  The implication is that Canada possesses the necessary 
power or capabilities to act unilaterally.   
                                                
17 John Holmes, Introduction, No Other Way: Canada and International Security Institutions, ed. John 
Holmes (Don Mills, Ontario: T.H. Best Printing Co. Ltd., 1986), 7. 
18 Holmes, The New Agenda for Canadian Internationalism, 15. 
19 John Holmes, Canada: The Reluctant Power, in Canada: A Middle Aged Power, (Toronto: McClelland 
and Steward Limited, 1976), 26-27. 
20 Tom Keating, Canada and the World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy, 
2nd ed. (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2002), 2. 
21 Keating, Canada and the World Order, 10. 
22 Keating, Canada and the World Order, 12. 
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James Eayrs was one of the first to assert that Canada was best described not as a 
middle power but rather a foremost power  foremost in the dictionary definition of 
most notable or prominent.23  Eayrs examined the nature of power and argued that 
because of its elusiveness, power may be seen not only in its possession by those who, 
on rational calculations, have no right to it but also in its lack by those who, on 
calculations no less rational, have every right to it.24  Countries may have the necessary 
capabilities to possess power, but they must also have legitimacy and the will to act if 
they are to succeed in using it.  Canada, in Eayrs view, possessed the legitimacy and the 
will to succeed in acting on its own.   
 Building upon Eayrs theme, Garth Stevenson and Norman Hillmer edited a 
volume entitled A Foremost Nation: Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World in 
which they focused on the changing position of Canada in the world.  The implication of 
their work was that Canada could, and should, pursue foreign policy through means other 
than multilateralism, and more specifically, bilateralism or unilateralism.25  Developing 
the argument even further, Peyton Lyon and Brian Tomlin next produced a work whose 
central argument was that Canada should now be regarded as a major power.26  They 
called for an approach that focused on the capabilities that Canada possessed rather than 
on how Canada should use its capabilities.27   
 David Dewitt and John Kirtons influential book, Canada as a Principal Power: A 
Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations, proceeded from the similar premise 
that Canada was truly a principal power, defined as a nation that stood . . . in the top 
tier of the global hierarchy of power and act[ed] without direct reference to any 
group.28  Principal powers, Dewitt and Kirton maintained, . . . act autonomously in 
                                                
23 James Eayrs, From middle to foremost power: Defining a new place for Canada in the hierarchy of 
world power, International Perspectives (March/April 1975), 15. 
24 Eayrs, From middle to foremost power, 17. 
25 Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson, Foreword, Canada: A Foremost Nation, eds. Norman Hillmer 
and Garth Stevenson, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 2. 
26 Peyton V. Lyon and Brian W. Tomlin, Canada as an International Actor, (Toronto: Macmillan of 
Canada, 1979), 72. 
27 Lyon and Tomlin, Canada as an International Actor, 72. 
28 David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and 
International Relations, (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1983), 15 and 38. 
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pursuit of their own interests, rather than as mediators among others or agents for 
them.29  
 It is clear that Dewitt and Kirton were talking about the phenomenon of 
unilateralism in Canadian foreign policy as a means used to further national interests.  
They argued that this approach is used by principal powers because of the competitive 
orientation of states to achieve and maintain a certain level of power.  States will act 
unilaterally to achieve power through the pursuit of national interests.30  They defined 
national interests largely in functional terms, as interests particular to the military, 
economic, social and cultural spheres.31   
The most recent and provocative claim concerning Canada and unilateralism has 
come from Allan Gotlieb, who has been referred to as one of Canadas foremost 
foreign-policy experts and practitioners.32  Gotlieb served as Undersecretary of State in 
the Department of External Affairs and as Canadian Ambassador to the United States 
from 1981 - 1988.  He argues that while it does not possess the resources of a great power, 
Canada has not infrequently used a unilateral approach as a means of pursuing its foreign 
policy objectives: When it comes to asserting our own territoriality based on national 
interests, Canadian unilateralism has been consistent, aggressive, and the dominant 
strategy for over half a century.  It cannot properly be seen as consisting of sporadic and 
minor deviations from the true path of multilateralism.33  
 The primary objective of this thesis is to investigate Gotliebs claim that 
unilateralism is a genuine feature of Canadian foreign policy, that it is a primary 
means by which Canada has protected its territorial interests.  The thesis explores 
more fully the three cases cited by Gotlieb as examples of Canada using unilateral 
initiatives to pursue its territorial interests: the Artic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 
in 1970, Canadas declaration of straight baselines around the Arctic Archipelago in 
1985, and the Turbot War of 1995.  More specifically, it seeks to determine if these 
cases were genuine examples of unilateralism and, if they were, if the primary force 
                                                
29 Dewitt and Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power, 38. 
30 Dewitt and Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power, 41-42. 
31 Dewitt and Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power, 39. 
32 Jack M. Mintz, Foreword in Realism and Romanticism in Canadas Foreign Policy, (Toronto: C.D. 
Howe Institute, 2004), page unnumbered. 
33 Gotlieb, Realism and Romanticism in Canadas Foreign Policy, 34. 
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driving Canadian unilateralism was the national interest of protecting Canadian 
territorial sovereignty.   
Further investigation of the cases cited by Gotlieb reveals that he is correct in one 
sense but not in another.  In all of the cases Canada undeniably acted unilaterally.  But 
Gotliebs analysis misses the larger reality that the three initiatives were pursued within a 
framework of multilateralism.  The cases do not serve as substantial evidence that Canada 
has an inherent preference to act unilaterally  where there is a zest for unilateralism in 
our genes.34  Canada acted unilaterally not simply for the purpose of protecting 
Canadas territorial integrity, but in the hopes of reinvigorating a multilateral process.   
The thesis shows that Canadas unilateral actions were consistent with pervading 
international legal norms.  More particularly, they were directed toward the larger goal of 
changing international law.  To this end they were successful.  In the case of the Arctic 
Waters Pollution Prevention Act, Canadas enactment of new laws lead to the formation 
of Article 234 at the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention which recognized the right of 
coastal states to adopt and enforce laws for the purposes of pollution prevention.   
Canadas unilateral actions provided impetus for the further pursuit of 
international negotiations.  In the case of the Territorial Seas and Geographical 
Coordinates (Area 7) Order, where Canada enacted straight baselines around the Arctic 
archipelago, its decisions forced the US to enter into negotiations with Canada 
concerning the Northwest Passage.  These negotiations led to the signing of the 1988 
Arctic Co-operation Agreement. 
Similarly in the case of the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act amendments enacted 
by Canada in the Turbot War, Canadian actions provided impetus for further international 
acceptance of the precautionary principle, where states recognize a duty to protect the 
environment from the unknown.  After Canada unilaterally introduced the Coastal 
Fisheries Protection Act amendments, Canada and the European Union worked together 
to increase the power of regulatory agencies such as the North Atlantic Fisheries 
Organization at the Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
                                                
34 Gotlieb, Realism and Romanticism in Canadas Foreign Policy, 33. 





The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 The first case cited by Gotlieb as a demonstration of Canadas unilateral 
behaviour for the purpose of protecting territorial sovereignty is the Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA).35  Others have not been so apt to view the AWPPA 
in this light. For instance, John Roberts sees the AWPPA as one of a multitude of actions 
taken by the Trudeau government that recognized the growing environmental conscience 
of Canadians.36  Thomas Axworthy, Trudeaus Chief of Staff, argues that the AWPPA 
was not so much about territory, but about recognizing that Canada had a protectionist 
role to play over the Arctic, as he states: Instead of beating the nationalist drum for 
territorial possessions, [the AWPPA] spoke about Canadas responsibility as a 
custodian of the North.37  Other analysts focus not so much on the unilateral aspect of 
Canadas action but rather on the way in which Canada deals with the US where there are 
policy differences between the two governments.  Maxwell Cohen and Edgar J. Dosman, 
stated that the AWPPA was largely an attempt to avoid overreacting to a US initiative 
that it considered unacceptable.38  Canadas actions have also been interpreted as illiberal.  
John Kirton and Don Munton maintain that Canadas actions are consistent with a state 
                                                
35 For the purposes of this paper, this case study includes not only the AWPPA legislation, but also 
amendments to the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, which changed the territorial sea limit from three 
miles to 12.  Though the title of the case study becomes a little bit confusing because it encompasses 
changes to two pieces of legislation, these pieces of legislation are often lumped together by most 
commentators on the AWPPA.  For the purposes of remaining consistent with other examinations of the 
case, I will also do so here. 
36See John Roberts, Meeting the Environmental Challenge, in Towards a Just Society: The Trudeau 
Years, eds. Thomas S. Axworthy and Pierre Elliot Trudeau (Markham, Ontario: Penguin Books Canada 
Ltd, 1990), 148-176. 
37 Thomas S. Axworthy, To Stand Not So High Perhaps but Always Alone: The Foreign Policy of Pierre 
Elliott Trudeau, in Towards a Just Society: The Trudeau Years, eds. Thomas S. Axworthy and Pierre 
Elliott Trudeau (Markham, Ontario: Penguin Books Canada Ltd, 1990), 29. 
38 See Maxwell Cohen, The Arctic and the National Interest, International Journal 26(1) (1970-1971), 52-
81 and E.J. Dosman, The Northern Sovereignty Crisis 1968-1970, in The Arctic in Question, ed. E.J. 
Dosman (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), 35-57. 
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redefining its foreign policy in a fundamentally different manner than the liberal 
internationalist perspective.39   
 While these are all interesting perspectives from which to view the AWPPA, they 
fail to explain why Canada adopted a unilateral approach as a matter of policy. The 
evidence reveals that Canada did so only after exhausting all other options for reaching 
an agreement with the US.  Moreover, its goal was to enact legislation that was 
acceptable to the international community.   
 The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that initiatives taken by Canada in 
introducing and implementing the AWPPA were not only an example of unilateralism but 
part of a larger exercise to move along the multilateral agenda regarding issues that were 
viewed as central to Canadas national interest.  
 
2.2 Societal Context Surrounding the Introduction of the AWPPA 
 The societal context in which the AWPPA was enacted provides important clues 
to understanding Canadas actions.  It was defined by the historic interactions between 
Canada and the US over the Northwest Passage, the discovery of a huge reserve of 
natural resources in the Arctic, growing public awareness of environmental threats, the 
emergence of a vibrant nationalism in Canadian society, and the strong beliefs of 
particular members of the Trudeau government.   
Historically, the high seas have been an issue of conflict between states.  The 
underlying principle that is supposed to regulate state behaviour on the oceans is 
freedom of the high seas, which affirms the oceans as an area of safe transit for ships 
from any country (based on the presumption of innocent passage).40  Yet as transit 
became more prevalent on the high seas, it became increasingly difficult to know who 
was in control of the oceans.  Longstanding contention existed between Canada, Norway, 
                                                
39 See John Kirton and Don Munton, Protecting the Canadian Arctic: The Manhattan Voyages, 1969-
1970, in Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases, eds. Don Munton and John Kirton (Scarborough, ON: 
Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., 1992), 205-224 and John Kirton and Don Munton Chapter 4: The Manhattan 
Voyages and their Aftermath, in Politics of the Northwest Passage, ed. Franklyn Griffiths (Kingston: 
McGill-Queens University Press, 1987), 67-97. 
40 Florsheim, Territorial Seas  3000 Year Old Question, Journal of Air, Law and Commerce 36(1970), 
73 as quoted in Edgar Gold, Pollution of the Sea and International Law: A Canadian Perspective, Journal 
of Maritime Law and Commerce 3(1) (October 1971), 18. 
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Denmark and the US over control of the high seas in the Arctic.41  Canada and the US in 
particular have disagreed over economic and resource developments, as well as 
international legal standards.42  One of the major reasons these disputes have arisen is 
that Canada recognizes the Arctic archipelago as part of its territory, while the US does 
not.   The Arctic sovereignty issue had come to a head in the mid-1960s when Canadian 
Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson attempted to draw baselines around the Arctic 
archipelago, claiming the area internal to Canadian waters.  The US administration 
responded that Canadas action was unacceptable, as it would set precedent for other 
countries to take similar action, which was not in the US interest.43 
 The discovery of a large amount of natural resources in the North caused renewed 
contention between Canada and the US over the Northwest Passage.  In particular, the 
finding of substantial oil reserves enticed greater US interest in developing the Northwest 
Passage as a commercial route.  In 1968, a considerable amount of oil was discovered off 
the coast of Prudhoe Bay in Alaska.  In an attempt to find a cost-effective manner to 
transport the oil, Humble Oil, an American company acting on behalf of EXXON, sent 
the Manhattan, an oil tanker, to test the feasibility of the Northwest Passage as a delivery 
route.44  Reacting to Humble Oils decision, Canada announced that it would have the 
icebreaker John A. Macdonald (nicknamed the Johnny Mac) accompany the Manhattan 
on its journey.  The Canadian government also created the Task Force on Northern 
Development (TFNOD) to examine the consequences of Northern resource 
development.45  On September 14, 1969, after much help from the Canadian icebreaker, 
the Manhattan completed its voyage of the Northwest Passage.  It was discovered that 
transporting oil by commercial tanker could save Humble Oil 60 cents/barrel compared to 
shipping by pipeline, but it also posed a real threat to the Arctic environment, as ice had 
significantly damaged the Manhattan.  Because of the favourable economic results, 
                                                
41 Cohen, The Arctic and the National Interest, 54-55. 
42 Cohen, The Arctic and the National Interest, 52 and 63-64.  
43 In particular, the US was concerned with protecting its interests in Indonesia and the Philippines.  See 
E.J. Dosman, The Northern Sovereignty Crisis 1968-70, 35. 
44 Kirton and Munton, Protecting the Canadian Arctic, 207. 
45 Kirton and Munton, Protecting the Canadian Arctic, 207and Elizabeth B. Elliot-Meisel, Arctic 
Diplomacy: Canada and the United States in the Northwest Passage, (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 
1998), 141. 
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Humble, ARCO, and British Petroleum began preparing other tankers for further test 
voyages.46 
 Canadians, like much of the global population, were learning about the disastrous 
effects that oil pollution could have on the environment.  On February 4, 1970, an oil 
tanker named the Arrow ran aground on the coast of Chedabucto Bay, Nova Scotia.  The 
disaster was strikingly similar to that of the Torrey Canyon, a large oil tanker that had 
crashed off the coast of Britain, spilling millions of gallons of oil into the ocean.  Both 
shipping disasters drew attention to the complex legal regulations that governed the 
international shipping industry.  The Arrows shipping company was owned by a 
corporation registered in Panama on behalf of a Monte Carlo corporation that was 
registered in Bermuda.  The ship itself had been loaned to a US company that was 
incorporated in the Bahamas.  This made it very difficult to determine the company, let 
alone the country, that could be held liable for damages, as the costs associated with 
cleaning up these oil spills were quite substantial.  Since Canada could not hold anyone 
responsible in the case of the Arrow, the Canadian government paid approximately three 
million dollars to clean up the oil dumped off the coast of Nova Scotia.47 
An emerging sense of nationalism in Canada in the late 1960s further contributed 
to tension between Canada and the US over the Arctic.  Canadians were concerned about 
their countrys ability to maintain a distinct identity in the face of the growing influence 
of the US.  For much of the Canadian public, the voyage of the Manhattan represented a 
direct challenge to Canadas sovereignty by the US.  It seemed indicative of US interest 
not only in Canadian territory, but also in Canadian resources.48  Though the vast 
Northern territory was an integral part of how Canadians defined their country, the issue 
was further complicated as the area had never been formally recognized as part of Canada 
by the international community.49   
The Canadian publics concerns over Canadas Northern territory were echoed in 
the Department of External Affairs.  External Affairs considered Canadian sovereignty in 
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the North non-negotiable.50  Acting as the lead department, it proposed a strategy 
whereby Canada would extend the territorial sea from three miles to 12-nautical miles by 
amending the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act.  Officials believed that this policy 
would receive wide acceptance in the international community as 57 other states had 
already enacted similar legislation.  External Affairs also claimed that the extension of 
the territorial sea would be the first step to gradually enclosing the waters of the Arctic 
archipelago within Canadian borders.51   
Another strategy explored by policy makers came from recommendations by the 
Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern Development.  It proposed that 
Canada consider the Northwest Passage a domestic strait under Canadian control.  
Accordingly, it recommended that Canada draw straight baselines around the Arctic 
archipelago.52   
Because Cabinet could not reach a compromise between these two positions, 
Trudeau entered discussions to try and broker some sort of agreement.53  He favoured 
adopting a 100-nautical mile pollution prevention zone in the Arctic, which was 
recommended by a group of his senior staff.54  He thought that the adoption of a pollution 
prevention zone would be better received in the international community than drawing 
straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago.55  The pollution prevention zone would 
still allow Canada to regulate innocent passage of ships up to 100-nautical miles from the 
Arctic shoreline, largely placing the Northwest Passage under Canadian jurisdiction.56   
Eventually, two different strategies were seriously considered by Cabinet.  The 
first, brought forward by Mitchell Sharp, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
advocated that Canada should implement only those measures likely to receive 
                                                
50 E.J. Dosman, The Northern Sovereignty Crisis 1968-70, 34. 
51 E.J. Dosman, The Northern Sovereignty Crisis, 1968-70, 50-51; Ivan L. Head and Pierre Elliott 
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Stewart Inc., 1995), 38-39. 
52 E.J. Dosman, The Northern Sovereignty Crisis, 1968-70, 50-51; Head and Trudeau, The Canadian 
Way, 38-39. 
53 Head and Trudeau, The Canadian Way, 33. 
54 This group included Ivan Head, International Relations Adviser to the Prime Minister; J.A. Beesley, legal 
advisor to the Department of External Affairs; Allan Gotlieb, former legal advisor in the Department of 
External Affairs; and Gordon Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet and Clerk of the Privy Council.   
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international support, while strengthening sovereignty through Northern development.  
Sharp argued that any actions taken by Canada must be either compatible with 
international law or, at the very least, be defensible in court.  As a result, the Canadian 
right to a sovereign Northern territory would eventually be recognized by the 
international community.57  But Trudeau still favoured the adoption of a pollution 
prevention zone because it would allow Canada to act as a leader in the international 
community, forging new conventions in international law in areas such as ice-covered 
waters.58   
Cabinet sided with Trudeau, deciding to create a 100-nautical mile pollution 
prevention zone, but disagreement arose over whether Canada, in order to prevent the 
regulation from being challenged by another country, should reserve its decision from the 
World Court.  Mitchell Sharp and Paul Martin (Sr.) were strongly against Canada placing 
a reservation with the World Court.  Both Sharp and Martin maintained that Canada had a 
reputation as a country that embraced international law.  To reserve the courts 
jurisdiction would be seen as hypocritical by the international community.  Furthermore, 
Canadas reservation could then be used by other countries to withdraw support from the 
World Court, an act to which Canada, not having reserved an World Court decision since 
1929, was firmly opposed.  Both Sharp and Martin were averse to setting such a 
dangerous precedent.59  In contrast, Trudeau and Allan Gotlieb contended that, given the 
uncertain state of international law on the territorial sea, Canada must reserve the Act 
from the jurisdiction of the World Court.60  Gotlieb argued that the US had no obligation 
to recognize either Canadas 12-mile territorial sea limit or the pollution prevention zone 
and could therefore be in a position to file a grievance against Canada on any action 
against a vessel.  A challenge at the World Court could see Canadas pollution prevention 
zone dismissed, further weakening Canadas case for sovereignty over the Northwest 
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Passage.  Eventually, as only Sharp and Martin remained opposed to the reservation, 
Cabinet agreed to such action.61 
Mitchell Sharp unveiled Canadas new Arctic sovereignty strategy on January 22, 
1970.  He announced that Canada would introduce a pollution prevention bill that 
regulated ships travelling through the Arctic archipelago.  In a declaratory statement, 
Canada also announced that the Manhattan would no longer receive assistance from any 
Canadian icebreakers until it met the new environmental regulations.  This announcement 
curtailed further exploratory voyages by Humble Oil, as Canada controlled the only 
icebreakers capable of navigating the Arctic waters.62 
 
2.3 Implementation of the AWPPA 
 Canada chose to act unilaterally through the introduction of two different pieces 
of legislation: the Artic Waters Pollution Prevention bill and amendments to the 
Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act.  The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention bill was 
introduced in the House of Commons on April 8, 1970, as Bill C-202, implementing a 
100-mile pollution prevention zone within the offshore jurisdiction of Canada.63  It 
outlined regulations for navigation and commercial transit in the Arctic archipelago, 
which protected the Arctic mainland and islands north of the sixtieth parallel from 
environmental damage.  To ensure these regulations were followed, the AWPPA 
authorized Canadian pollution prevention officers to board and inspect ships transiting 
the area.64   
Bill C-203 amended the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act to create fishing 
zones in areas adjacent to the coast of Canada, establishing a 12-mile territorial sea limit 
instead of the previous three-mile limit.65  Both pieces of legislation passed in the House 
of Commons unanimously and were given royal assent on June 26, 1970.66  Together, the 
legislation allowed Canada to reinforce jurisdiction over two of the narrowest parts of the 
Northwest Passage, the Barrows and Prince of Wales straits, which were integral to 
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62 Kirton and Munton, Protecting the Canadian Arctic, 215, 216. 
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Northwest Passage navigation.  Accordingly, Canada secured jurisdiction over the 
Northwest Passage without making a direct claim to sovereignty.67  
 It is inaccurate to assert that Canadas decision making process was largely a 
reaction to public outrage over the Manhattan incident.68  The Canadian government was 
aware of the planned voyage of the Manhattan long before it gained public attention.  
While the government took substantial time to determine a policy strategy, this delay was 
largely due to the contentious nature of the issue, not only for Canadians, but also for 
Canadian-American relations.  Once a strategy was in place, the Canadian government 
acted swiftly on a variety of initiatives well before the AWPPA was introduced in the 
House of Commons.  These initiatives included a series of public declarations, 
multilateral discussions, bilateral discussions, and, finally, unilateral action.   
 Even while working on the language of the AWPPA, the Canadian government 
issued a variety of public declarations.  Both Trudeau and Sharp spoke publicly about 
Canadas position on Arctic sovereignty.  The government also announced that then 
Governor General Roland Michener would tour Canadas Arctic from April 22 to May 4, 
1969.  On May 15, 1969, Trudeau declared that the Arctic lands and the Arctic 
continental shelf were considered part of Canadian territory.  During this speech, Trudeau 
also declared that Canada viewed the Arctic waters as national terrain.69  In the Throne 
Speech of that year, the government announced that the Arctic was as an area of prime 
importance for Canada.  Specifically, the speech detailed Canadas role and responsibility 
as a custodian of the Arctic. 
Throughout this period, Canada also announced a number of symbolic initiatives 
pertaining to Canadas effective occupation of the North.  The Canadian flag was flown 
more prominently on public buildings and property in the area.  Military flights by patrol 
aircraft became more frequent as part of a more active military presence in the North.70  
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The Prime Minister also invited Queen Elizabeth II to tour the Canadian North.  When 
Queen Elizabeth II stopped in Yellowknife in July, 1969, her speech highlighted the 
importance of fighting pollution.71 
 At the same time Canada was issuing declarations of its unique role in the Arctic, 
a variety of multilateral discussions were also held.  In November of 1969, Trudeau met 
with United Nations Secretary General U Thant, using the meeting to learn if other 
members of the international community had strong objections to Canada regulating 
environmental standards in the Arctic archipelago.72  The Canadian government also 
lobbied other Arctic and non-Arctic coastal states to support its initiative, both prior to 
and following the passage of the AWPPA. 73  One of the first countries to support the 
AWPPA was the Soviet Union, as the legislation supported its claim to the Northeast 
Passage.74     
 Canada was at the same time attempting bilateral negotiations with US leaders.  In 
March of 1969, Trudeau expressed concerns to then President Richard Nixon, over 
international respect for Canadian fishing rights and territorial sea boundaries.  At a 
ministerial meeting in June of that year, Canada agreed to continue negotiating with the 
US and to provide significant notice preceding its claim over the North.  In response, the 
US warned that an extension of Canadian fishing and territorial rights would constitute a 
violation of international law.  By behaving in such a manner, Canada would set 
dangerous precedent, leading to further repercussions for US interests in other areas, 
particularly Southeast Asia, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East.  When discussions 
reached a stalemate, the US administration indicated that a Canadian claim to Arctic 
sovereignty would result in an American challenge before the World Court.75 
Canada unilaterally implemented the AWPPA to mixed reactions from the 
international community.  The introduction of the bill was quite controversial in the US.  
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Humble Oil, in accordance with its corporate interests, cooperated with the new 
regulations even though Canada possessed little means of enforcement. 76  In March of 
1970 the company requested the assistance of a Canadian icebreaker for the Manhattans 
second voyage.  It also agreed to the presence of a Canadian government representative 
aboard their ship to ensure its compliance with the pollution prevention standards dictated 
by the AWPPA.77   
The Nixon Administration did not take such a conciliatory approach.  On April 9, 
1970, the day following the AWPPAs introduction in the House of Commons, a State 
Department press release announced that the US would not recognize Canadas claim to 
Arctic waters, or its creation of a 12-nautical mile fishing zone.78  On April 14, 1970, 
Canada received a diplomatic note from Washington which chastised the country for 
unilaterally resolving an issue that should have been settled multilaterally.  The note also 
stated that the US, irrespective of Canadas claims, would continue recognizing the 
Northwest Passage as an international strait.79   
Relations between the Prime Minister and the President also remained tense.  
Nixon reportedly refused to take Trudeaus call announcing the Canadian governments 
policy.80  Shortly afterward, he announced a policy that proposed to reduce imports of 
Canadian oil by 20%; the policy would be in effect from March 1 until the end of the year.  
Also signalling its strong opposition to Canadas initiative, the US Congress, on April 1, 
1970, approved the construction of the worlds most powerful non-nuclear icebreaker.81  
Twelve years later, the US Administration would still not accept Canadas position, 
refusing to sign Article 234 of the Law of the Sea Accord, which gave Arctic coastal 
states the right to adopt and enforce laws for the prevention, reduction and control of 
marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas.82 
                                                
76 Elliot-Meisel, Arctic Diplomacy, 143. 
77 Kirton and Munton, Protecting the Canadian Arctic, 221. 
78 Richard Rohmer, The Artic Imperative: An Overview of the Energy Crisis, (Toronto:McLelland and 
Stewart Limited, 1973), 55-56. 
79 Rohmer, The Arctic Imperative, 57. 
80 Globe and Mail, 25 August 1973 as quoted in J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre 
Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 81. 
81 Kirton and Munton, Protecting the Canadian Arctic, 221. 
82 John Honderich, Arctic Imperative: Is Canada Losing the North?, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1987), 53. 
  18 
 
 
Though the US reaction to the AWPPA was decidedly negative, Canadians 
overwhelmingly supported the legislation.  In a rare show of solidarity, Members of the 
House of Commons supported it unanimously, 198-0.83  Surprisingly, the most frequent 
complaint by citizens was that Canada had not been aggressive enough, a grievance 
especially voiced by opposition leaders in the House of Commons.  Throughout 1969, the 
Globe and Mail printed many letters urging the government to adopt a stronger position 
on protecting Canadas northern territory.84   
 
2.4 Analysis of the Implementation of the AWPPA 
Most commentators concur with Ivan Heads conclusion that the AWPPA was 
used to weave a fabric of sovereignty in the north; a strategy of environmental concern 
and protection which allowed Canada to reinforce sovereignty claims, consistent with the 
spirit of international law.85  As Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel points out, the right of innocent 
passage was not suspended under the AWPPA, but instead was redefined to acknowledge 
the environmental consequences of shipping in the Northwest Passage.  It was the first 
time any nation asserted authority over an area of water for environmental reasons.86  
Peter Dobell agrees with Head and asserts that the pollution-control legislation was 
adopted as a device for gaining control without the need to assert sovereigntyThe 
governments action was an extension of jurisdiction, not a claim to sovereignty, an 
assertion of effective control without the confrontation that a claim to sovereignty might 
have produced.87  As a result, the AWPPA forwarded Canadas claim over the 
Northwest Passage, which, in time it was hoped, would receive further acceptance within 
the international community. 
Clearly, the AWPPA aided recognition of the Northwest Passage as part of 
Canadian territory.  The case is also a clear instance of Canada exercising unilateral 
foreign policy.  Gotlieb is correct in his assertion that the AWPPA is an illustration of 
Canada acting unilaterally for the purposes of protecting its territorial integrity.  But he 
fails to recognize that Canada acted unilaterally within a framework of multilateralism.  
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Canadas claims over the Arctic were not made in a vacuum.  As demonstrated, Canada 
continued to employ bilateral and multilateral means prior to the introduction of the 
AWPPA, acting unilaterally only after exhausting all other possibilities of reaching a 
satisfactory agreement with the US.  Upon unilateral implementation of the AWPPA, 
Canada was quick to return to multilateral negotiations, lobbying other countries to 
support the legislation.  Negotiations between Canada and the US also resumed.   
Canadas unilateralism should not be characterized as a deviation from liberal 
internationalism to some new paradigm in which Canadian foreign policy would be 
conducted.88  There are several authors who provide evidence that Canada continues to 
prefer to work multilaterally to solve challenges in the international community but, as 
the AWPPA demonstrates, will act unilaterally on occasion.89  Unilateralism allowed 
Canadas position to receive recognition in the international community, regardless of US 
opposition.  Furthermore, it may be argued that Canada had no other option but to act 
unilaterally.  If the US was determined to act in a way that posed a threat to Canadas 
sovereignty, and if as Franklyn Griffiths states, Canadian-Soviet relations were limited by 
American-Soviet relations, than Canada had few allies to work with in the North, and 
may have been forced to act unilaterally to protect its interests. 90 
Canadas unilateral initiative also served other purposes.  By introducing the 
AWPPA, Canada actually moved the agenda on the rights of coastal states forward.  
More specifically, Canada created new norms in international law where none had 
previously existed.  No state had extended its jurisdiction over surrounding coastal waters 
for the purposes of pollution control.  As Alan Beesley, then Legal Adviser to the 
Department of External Affairs, points out, State practice is an essential part of the 
international law-making process and, where there is a lacuna in the law, may be the only 
means for a state, acting reasonably and responsibly, to protect itself.91  In fact, Canada 
was not the first country to act unilaterally concerning the Law of the Sea.  In 1945, the 
Truman Declaration claimed the continental shelf around the US as part of its territory.  
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Following this announcement, other coastal states made similar declarations and the 
principle was eventually adopted in international law at the 1958 Geneva Convention on 
the Law of the Sea. 92  In the case of the AWPPA, Canada attempted to extend existing 
provisions to protect its coastal boundaries from pollution.93  As coastal states had 
followed the US in the post-war years, with the case of the AWPPA, they followed 
Canada.   
Canadas intention to create new international law is evidenced by an examination 
of statements by Trudeau and Sharp about the AWPPA.  In a letter sent to the United 
Nations in which Canada reserved its decision from the World Court, the Canadian Prime 
Minister wrote: State practice, or unilateral action by a state, has always been accepted 
as one of the ways of developing international law.94  This explanation was further 
elaborated by Mitchell Sharp, addressing the House of Commons on April 16: State 
practice, or in other words, unilateral action by states, has always been a legitimate means 
open to states to develop customary international law.The bill we have introduced 
should be regarded as a stepping stone toward the elaboration of an international legal 
order95    Trudeau provided a similar explanation in a speech to the Canadian Press 
Association: In this respect we have acted as we have because of necessity, but also 
because of our awareness of the impetus given to the development of international law by 
individual state practice.96 
Certain commentators have suggested that Canadas actions resulted from a 
growing environmental consciousness among Canadians. 97  While the AWPPA largely 
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concerned regulating navigation for the purposes of pollution prevention, this concern 
was not reflected in Canadian society.  Even after the Torrey Canyon ran aground off the 
coast of Britain, interest in environmental issues remained low in Canada.98  Instead, 
environmental issues allowed the government to frame recognition of Canadian 
sovereignty within the environmental context of the AWPPA, extending Canadas 
territory in a manner acceptable to the international community. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 The case of the AWPPA clearly demonstrates the willingness of Canada to act 
unilaterally to maintain territorial integrity.  The Canadian government enacted and 
implemented the AWPPA in defence of its position as the primary custodian of the 
Northwest Passage.  Accordingly, the AWPPA confirms Gotliebs claim that Canada will 
act in a unilateral manner to defend territorial interests.  But Gotlieb fails to recognize 
that Canadas unilateral action occurred within a multilateral framework; only after 
Canada exhausted all other bilateral and multilateral options did it implement the 
AWPPA unilaterally.  Furthermore, after enacting the AWPPA, Canada restarted 
negotiations with the US and other Arctic and non-Arctic coastal states to reinforce its 
position. It also needs to be recognized that the AWPPA was implemented in a manner 
largely consistent with pervading international norms.  As a result, Canada used the 
AWPPA to create international law where none previously existed, while constructing a 
viable claim to Canadian sovereignty in the North.  
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The Territorial Sea and Geographic Coordinates (Area 7) Order (TSGCO): 
Drawing Straight Baselines around the Arctic Archipelago 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The second case of Canadian unilateralism cited by Gotlieb and examined here is 
the order passed by the Mulroney government, drawing straight baselines around the 
Arctic archipelago known as Standing Order Regulation 85-872, the Territorial Sea and 
Geographic Coordinates (Area 7) Order (TSGCO).99  As a result of the TSGCO, Canada 
and the US negotiated the 1988 Arctic Co-operation Agreement.  As with the AWPPA, 
commentators disagree over the significance of the TSGCO.  Rob Huebert maintains that, 
in the case of the TSGCO, Canadas behaviour was caused by a deliberate US violation 
of Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.  Canadas actions may have 
appeared to be proactive, but in reality, they were largely reactive.100  Elizabeth Elliot-
Meisel supports Huebert in her evaluation of the TSGCO, suggesting that the Canadian 
government acted in a passive-reactive manner where Canada sought to assert its 
sovereignty on a de jure, rather than on a de facto, basis.101   
Ronald Purver takes a very different stance on the TSGCO.  He claims that it was 
the most dramatic assertion of Arctic sovereignty claims ever made by a Canadian 
government.102  Franklyn Griffiths agrees with Purver and suggests that countries are 
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likely to act in a unilateral manner in the Arctic because it is a region where there are few 
interests except for economic ones.103 
While these are interesting characterizations of the TSGCO, they fail to 
adequately explain Canadas unilateral behaviour.  The evidence suggests that Canadas 
unilateral declaration, enacted through the TSGCO, provided the impetus to restart stalled 
negotiations with the US, leading to the 1988 Arctic Co-operation Agreement.  This 
chapter demonstrates how Canadas unilateral behaviour can be best explained as an 
initiative not only to assert Canadas territorial sovereignty, but more importantly, to keep 
an issue of national importance on the international agenda.   
 
3.2 Societal Context Surrounding the TSGCO 
The societal context within which the Mulroney government acted in passing the 
TSGCO was defined by different Canadian and US perceptions of the Northwest Passage; 
issues of accessibility to Northern resources, especially oil resources; problems resulting 
from a lack of communication between Canada and the US over the Northwest Passage; 
and the Arctic voyage of the US Coast Guard vessel, the Polar Sea, which culminated, as 
had the voyage of the Manhattan fifteen years earlier, in an outpouring of criticism by the 
Canadian public.  
The drawing of straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago again caused 
significant cleavages in Canadian and US perceptions of the North.  For Canada, the 
Northwest Passage symbolized lingering sovereignty questions over the territory.  
Control over the Arctic had important connotations for Canadas national identity, as 
Canadians viewed the North as an inherent part of their country, whether the rest of the 
international community agreed or not.104  While Canadians thought of Arctic threats in 
terms of the US, the US considered Canada to be merely an afterthought.105   
Though the Canadian position on the Northwest Passage had evolved somewhat 
since the 1970s, the US still maintained that the Northwest Passage was an international 
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strait.  The US was concerned with ensuring, in the context of the Cold War, that the 
Soviet Union did not have the ability to attack the US from a Northern location.  Since 
1978, concerns had heightened over rumours of the sighting of Soviet submarines in the 
straits of the Arctic archipelago.106  For the US, apprehension over Northern security 
often translated into anxiety over Canadas ability to defend the North. 107  Canada did 
not have the defence capacity to satisfy Washington that the Soviet Union could not 
launch an attack on the US across the North.  With the enactment and implementation of 
the AWPPA, Canada had attempted to take a stronger stance on the Northwest Passage.  
As of 1973, Canadian officials cited the waters of the passage as historically internal to 
Canada even if they were unable to defend it.108   
  While Canada and the US could not agree on the status of the Northwest Passage, 
corporate interest in exploiting Northern resources grew throughout this period.  Since 
the successful voyage of the Manhattan, there had been considerable appeal in the 
development of a commercial shipping route through the Northwest Passage to capitalize 
on the growing oil reserves discovered in the area.  Developments included Petro-
Canadas Arctic Pilot Project, Dome Canadas idea to run icebreaking oil tankers year-
round from the Beaufort Sea to East coast ports, and Panarctic Oils shipping route from 
the Arctic to Montreal.109  Canada had done little to address these new development 
projects and still did not have a comprehensive Arctic maritime policy.110  As a result, the 
federal government had also not addressed Inuit concerns over land rights and ownership 
of resources.  Louis Tapardjuk, then president of the Baffin Regional Inuit Association, 
stated that the Canadian government must develop a position acceptable to the Inuit 
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peoples or would face the start of something that [the Inuit peoples] simply [could] not 
allow to happen.111     
Without a comprehensive Arctic maritime policy, there had been little incentive 
for Canada and the US to fix communication problems.  Due to the implementation of the 
AWPPA, Canada and the US remained in sharp disagreement over how the Northwest 
Passage was recognized.  The US had not signed on to Article 234 of the United Nations 
Law of the Sea Convention  which recognized the right of coastal states to regulate 
areas outside of its jurisdiction for the purposes of pollution control.112  Discussions 
broke down whenever Canada and the US attempted to develop a more collegial position 
on the Arctic.  
Problems culminating from the uncommunicative relationship between Canada 
and the US were well illustrated by the voyage of the Polar Sea.113  After the US ship the 
Northwind broke down due to mechanical problems, the Polar Sea was assigned by the 
US Coast Guard to the Northwinds duty in Greenland.  Afterward the US Coast Guard 
decided to send the Polar Sea back to the Beaufort Sea from Greenland through the 
Northwest Passage.  Travelling through the Northwest Passage instead of the Panama 
Canal would save 20  30 days of travel time and approximately 500 000 dollars. 114  The 
US Coast Guard informed the US State Department and the Canadian Coast Guard of the 
intended journey on May 21, 1985.115  On June 11, 1985, the Canadian government 
replied that the journey could proceed on a cooperative basis.116 
 Once the voyage of the Polar Sea garnered significant public attention in Canada, 
it became an acute problem.  Although the voyage had earlier been approved by the 
Canadian government, this position produced criticism by both the Canadian press and 
the Canadian public who referred to Canadas lack of position as toothless, 
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embarrassing, and an affront to Canada.117  In response to public attacks, the 
Mulroney government released another statement  the day before the Polar Seas 
voyage began on July 31, 1985.  In the statement, which was signed by Secretary of State 
for External Affairs, Joe Clark, Minister of Transport, Don Mazankowski, and Minister 
of Northern Affairs David Crombie, Canada expressed deep regret over US unwillingness 
to recognize the Northwest Passage as part of Canadas jurisdiction.  The Canadian 
government also granted permission for the voyage of the Polar Sea, although it was 
never requested.119   
The Canadian governments last minute objection to the intended voyage 
bewildered the US government.  When the US Coast Guard received notification from 
the Canadian Coast Guard for the voyage to proceed, it was thought that the issue was 
settled. 120  The voyage, it was agreed, was to be conducted in compliance with the 
regulations outlined in the AWPPA: three Canadian observers would be on board the 
Polar Sea, and the ship would be escorted by the Canadian icebreaker the John A. 
Macdonald.121  But the Canadian government was still not happy. A US Coast Guard 
official stated in response: the voyage is not meant to test Canadas claim to the 
Northwest Passage, merely to take the shortest route from Greenlandto Alaska, before 
the ice sets in.122   Even the US Ambassador to Canada, Paul Robinson, was surprised 
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by the contention that was created in Canada over the voyage, stating that the dispute 
was nothing more than a creation of the news media.123   
Although the publics reaction to the voyage of the Polar Sea surprised both 
governments, it well illustrated the growing Canadian discontent over the Mulroney 
governments friendly relationship with the Reagan administration.  With the 
restructuring of the North American Aerospace Defence Command earlier that year, 
Canadians were aware of the strategic importance of the Arctic.124  Many were also 
adamantly opposed to the free trade negotiations that had started with the US.  These 
fears were reinforced and furthered by the voyage of the Polar Sea, which to Canadians, 
demonstrated the emptiness of claims made by Prime Minister Mulroney and then 
President Ronald Reagan on the importance of good relations between the two 
countries.125  Instead, many Canadians viewed the Polar Sea as a perfect example of the 
exploitation of Canadian interests for US ones. 
The Privy Council Office (PCO) was quickly given the assignment of rectifying 
the controversy over the Polar Sea.  In response to public backlash over the voyage, the 
PCO examined policies that could reaffirm Canadas sovereignty.  In August of 1985, the 
PCO contacted various line departments working on Canadian sovereignty initiatives.  
Policies were targeted included those that: indirectly enhanced Canadas claims, were 
symbolically important to Canadas sovereignty, or would directly protect Canadas 
Arctic territory and surrounding waters.126  These initiatives were discussed from August 
21  23, 1985 at the Priorities and Planning Committee meeting of Cabinet in 
Vancouver.127 
Providing leadership on the issue were certain Members of Cabinet, including 
those on the subcommittee of Defence and External Relations for the Priorities and 
Planning Committee of Cabinet.  This subcommittee was chaired by Joe Clark.  In 
general, Prime Minister Mulroney was more apt to focus on specific foreign relations 
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issues that interested him, such as free trade,128  and thus he limited his involvement in 
the TSGCO to the occasional brief discussion with Reagan.129  Accordingly, the decision-
making process was largely dominated by Joe Clark, the Department of External Affairs, 
and the Cabinet subcommittee of Defence and External Relations.130 
Cabinet considered a number of polices that had been strategically developed by 
senior officials, in the event that Canadas sovereignty was again challenged by another 
case similar to the voyage of the Manhattan. 131  Clark strongly pushed to draw straight 
baselines around the Arctic archipelago and to declare the area part of Canadas internal 
waters.  The act of drawing straight baselines had already been debated by Canadian 
governments for quite some time but previous discussions to this point were not well-
received by the international community.132  However, recent decisions at the World 
Court suggested that, if challenged, Canadas claim might now be supported.133  
Important developments on the Law of the Sea, including Article 234, and the emergence 
of exclusive economic zones, could also substantiate Canadas case in the event of a 
challenge to the TSGCO.134   
Canada also looked at other strategies to strengthen its Northern sovereignty 
claim.  Included among these polices were an increase in surveillance flights and more 
substantial naval activities in the North.  Although these initiatives had taken place since 
the voyage of the Manhattan, they would now happen on a greater scale.  Surprisingly, 
the most controversial strategy was the construction of a class 8 icebreaker.  The Polar 8, 
at a cost of 500 million dollars, would have been the most powerful icebreaker in the 
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world. 135  However the icebreaker would take approximately five years to build and the 
government could not find a Canadian company to build it. The Department of National 
Defence also had concerns that its construction would deplete its operating budget.  
These problems had persisted since the government first looked at building a class 7 
icebreaker in the 1970s.136 
 
3.3 Implementation of the TSGCO 
 The eventual decision reached by the Canadian government was to unilaterally 
implement straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago. Joe Clark announced in the 
House of Commons on September 10, 1985 that the government had adopted an order-in-
council which established straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago.137  The 
baselines would come into effect on January 1, 1986, and would include both the islands 
of the Arctic archipelago, and the surrounding waters.  When Clark announced the order, 
he argued that the voyage of the Polar Sea demonstrated that Canada in the past had not 
developed the means to ensure our sovereignty over time.138  As Canada ha[d] long 
maintained and exercised sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago, its 
declaration would allow Canada to further protect the area.139  Henceforth, the AWPPA, 
the 200-mile exclusive economic zone, and the 12-mile territorial sea would now be 
measured from the new baselines.140 
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 The enactment and implementation of the TSGCO was more of an ad hoc reaction, 
defined by the publics reaction to the voyage of the Polar Sea,141 than the AWPPA.  The 
Canadian governments response to the ships transit came only after there was 
significant public outcry.  Still, it is important to remember that the governments policy 
options were not created overnight; they had essentially been under development since 
the voyage of the Manhattan in the early 1970s.  Even if the Mulroney government was 
unprepared to respond to the Polar Sea voyage, senior public servants certainly were.  
That the Mulroney government was relatively new and in the process of restructuring 
many government departments may also partially account for Canadas delay in 
responding to the crisis.142  Once the Mulroney government decided on a plan, it moved 
relatively quickly to implement it through public declarations and unilateral initiatives, 
which helped facilitate an environment conducive to restarting negotiations with the US. 
 Before implementing the TSGCO, the Mulroney government made a variety of 
public declarations outlining Canadas position on the Arctic.  Both Mulroney and Clark 
discussed Canadas position in the House of Commons, before the press, and at public 
engagements.  In late August, Mulroney issued a strong statement on Canadas 
sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, arguing that any declaration otherwise would be 
seen as an unfriendly act.143  Mulroney also gave a television interview where he 
announced that the Northwest Passage [is] ours lock, stock and icebergs.144  Clarks 
statements on the Arctic were just as robust.  He contended that any cooperation with 
the US or with other Arctic nations shall be only on the basis of full respect for Canadas 
sovereignty. 145  He also reminded the media that Canadian observers would be on board 
the Polar Sea in order to guide them through the waters we consider to be ours.146   
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 In addition to the TSGCO, the Mulroney government announced a number of 
other initiatives.  These included the immediate adoption of the Canadian Laws Offshore 
Application Act, an increase in surveillance flights and naval activity in the Arctic, and 
construction of a class 8 polar icebreaker.  Assured that any challenge to the AWPPA or 
the TSGCO at court would result in a decision in Canadas favour, the government also 
announced the withdrawal of the 1970 reservation over the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
World Court.  Finally, Canada issued a declaratory statement announcing its willingness 
to begin immediate talks with the US on co-operation in Arctic waters, on the basis of 
full respect for Canadian sovereignty.147  All of these policies were implemented largely 
without consulting other states.  Instead, Canada relied on precedent in international law 
and other international norms to provide assurance that these initiatives would be 
accepted by the international community.148 
Not surprisingly, the implementation of the TSGCO received mixed reactions in 
the international community.  Even before Canada made its policy announcements in 
September of 1985, the Soviet Union announced its support for Canadas position.149  
Evgeni Pozdnyakov of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa stated that the Soviet Union 
supported Canadas position that the Northwest Passage is Canadian internal waters just 
as the Soviet Union believes the Northeast Passage belongs to them.150  In contrast, a 
dozen other countries objected to Canadas claims in writing.151  Canadas assertion of 
sovereignty was also not recognized by the US, although the language used by the US 
administration seemed a little more moderate than it had been at the time of the 
announcement of the AWPPA. As a State Department memorandum put it, we regret 
that Canada is taking this action but we appreciate that Canada recognizes that the matter 
affects U.S. interests.152  Even though the US did not recognize Canadas position, it 
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entered into negotiations almost immediately after Canada made its policy announcement.  
On the same day Clark introduced the measures in the House of Commons, Thomas Niles, 
the new US Ambassador to Canada, announced that the US would begin talks directly 
with Canada on the issue of Northern sovereignty.153 
It is important to remember that the US showed a willingness to enter into 
negotiations only after Canada unilaterally announced its policy initiatives.  From 
Canadas point of view, the primary goal of the meetings was to have the US recognize 
Canadas claim to Arctic waters.154  Not only would this allow Canada to assert its 
sovereignty, but it would also ensure that a politically volatile situation was mitigated 
in a manner defendable before the Canadian Parliament and the public.155   
Initially, discussions were dominated by Leonard Legault and Barry Mawhinney 
from Canadas Department of External Affairs and David Colson from the US State 
Department. 156  Early negotiations were constrained by the fact that neither country was 
prepared to make any concessions. Canada insisted that its sovereignty over the 
Northwest Passage must be recognized.  The US was unwilling to acquiesce formal 
recognition of the Passage as an internal strait to Canada.157  Discussions quickly became 
deadlocked and were only rejuvenated by a personal visit between Reagan and Mulroney.  
The two leaders agreed to appoint special envoys that would report directly to them on 
the status of negotiations.  Canada appointed Derek Burney, Mulroneys chief of staff, 
and the US appointed Ed Derwinski, the Under-Secretary of State.158  Yet even after the 
appointment of special negotiating teams, discussions ended in stalemate.   
In the end, the personal relationship between Mulroney and Reagan was key to 
achieving a final agreement.  During a meeting in April 1987, Mulroney showed Reagan, 
using a globe, the area that Canadas claim would affect.  Upon seeing the area, Reagan 
acknowledged that [it] look[ed] a little different than the maps they showed [him] on the 
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plane coming into Ottawa.159  Reagan committed the US to the achievement of an 
agreement that was equitable to both Canadian and US interests.160  In a speech later that 
day in the House of Commons, he announced that [both Mulroney and I] are determined 
to find a solution based on mutual respect for sovereignty and our common security and 
other interests.161  The personal relationship between the two leaders clearly revitalized 
and ensured the success of the negotiation process.162  On January 11, 1988, Canada and 
the US signed the Arctic Co-operation Agreement.   
The Canada-US Arctic Co-operation Agreement was designed primarily to serve 
a functional purpose.  Specifically, it regulated icebreaker traffic in the Arctic, whereby 
the US pledge[d] that all navigation by US icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada 
to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of the Government of Canada.163  
Supporters of the agreement believed it amounted to US recognition of Canadian 
sovereignty, as US icebreakers would now have to receive Canadian permission before 
transiting the Northwest Passage.  Critics maintained that the agreement offered little 
assurance of Canadian sovereignty, as it applies only to government icebreakers.164  
Furthermore, the agreement specifically outlined that it did not affect the respective 
positions of [either government] on the Law of the Sea in any area.165  But when all was 
said and done, the agreement still allowed Canada to exercise jurisdiction over the 
Northwest Passage in a functional manner.  Arguably as well, it could assert sovereignty 
over the area in a way acceptable to the international community.  There was hope that 
this gradualist exercise would eventually lead to full recognition of the Northwest 
Passage as part of Canada.   
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3.4 Analysis of the Implementation of the TSGCO 
 Most commentators on the TSGCO believe it was an attempt by Canada to assert 
sovereignty over the North.  These individuals contend that Canada traditionally 
controlled the Arctic through functional jurisdiction, where, rather than attempting to 
claim sovereignty outright, Canada affirmed an authority to act only in specific areas.166  
Accordingly, they maintain that the TSGCO is a refreshing example of Canadas 
willingness to accept no substitutes and pursue the singular goal of sovereignty.167   
 Although Canada declared its sovereignty in an outright manner with the TSGCO, 
the Canada-US Arctic Co-operation Agreement called for the continued exercise of 
functional jurisdiction over the Arctic.  Through a process of integrative bargaining, 
Canada and the US forged an agreement that was mutually satisfactory, even though it 
did not reflect the original goals both had hoped to achieve in the negotiation process.168  
Originally, Canada was unwilling to consider any policy that did not require the US to 
recognize the Northwest Passage as part of Canadian territory, which was unacceptable to 
the US.  The final agreement acknowledged that the US must receive permission from 
Canada for the transit of government-owned icebreakers conducting scientific research in 
the Northwest Passage.  Forged through compromise, the agreement allowed Canada to 
extend its control over the Northwest Passage.169  However, Canadas control is extended 
for functional purposes and not for the purposes of sovereignty outright. 
 Still, the TSGCO case is clearly an example of Canada acting unilaterally to assert 
its territorial sovereignty.  It announced the implementation of straight baselines around 
the Arctic archipelago, and other related measures, basically without consulting other 
countries. Furthermore, these initiatives were implemented under Canadian legislation.  
In this sense, Gotlieb is correct in characterizing the TSGCO as an instance of 
unilateralism. 
 What Gotlieb fails to note is that Canadas unilateral action occurred largely 
within a framework of multilateralism.  Although Canada did not consult with other 
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countries before implementing the TSGCO, the Department of External Affairs 
maintained that international norms and, in particular, recent decisions by the World 
Court, would support Canadas claims. What was acceptable to the international 
community influenced Canadas decision to implement the TSGCO.   
 Although Canada acted unilaterally to protect its territorial interests, it was more 
concerned with restarting a series of negotiations with the US.  Previously, all discussions 
between Canada and the US on the Northwest Passage had broken down.  When Canada 
declared its new Canadian maritime Arctic strategy, it also announced the start of 
immediate talks with the US on co-operation in Arctic waters, on the basis of full 
respect for Canadian sovereignty.170  It was only by maintaining a firm stance on the 
Northwest Passage that Canada could provide the impetus for new discussions with the 
US.  As a result, Canadas initiatives, though implemented unilaterally, were meant to 
restart bilateral negotiations. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 As this chapter demonstrates, the TSGCO was a clear instance of Canada acting 
unilaterally to protect its territorial integrity.  Canada unilaterally implemented straight 
baselines around the Arctic archipelago to protect its claim as the custodian of the 
Northwest Passage, supporting Gotliebs claim that Canada will act unilaterally to protect 
its territorial interests.  What has been demonstrated here is that the decision to enact and 
implement the TSGCO was consistent with recent developments in international law and 
decisions at the World Court, and had as its larger goal the creation of a new impetus for 
negotiations between Canada and the US that would further the recognition of Canadas 
jurisdiction over the Arctic.  
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 Chapter 4 
 
The Coastal Fisheries Protection Act Amendments: 
 




 The third and final case referenced by Gotlieb where Canada acted unilaterally to 
affirm its sovereign territory is the Turbot War of 1995, or rather the conflict between 
Canada and the European Union (EU) over offshore fishing resulting from the 
introduction of amendments to Canadas Coastal Fisheries Protection Act (CFPA). 171  
Though Gotlieb is certain that the Turbot War is a case in which Canada proceeded 
unilaterally to protect its territorial integrity, others disagree. They argue that the CFPA 
amendments were basically an attempt to preserve the environment.  Allen L. Springer 
argues that Canadas actions in the Turbot War constitute clear evidence that countries 
will act unilaterally to protect important environmental resources.172  Tuchman Matthews, 
Kaplan, and Homer-Dixon concur with Springers position and contend environmental 
issues should be considered a primary cause leading to international conflict more 
generally.173  Similarly, Peter J. Stoett recognizes that Canadas actions advanced 
international acceptance of the precautionary principle whereby states have a duty to 
protect the environment from the unknown. 174   
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But other academics who have studied the Turbot War are more apt to 
characterize Canadas unilateral actions as part of a broader multilateral agenda.  Andrew 
F. Cooper maintains that Canadas resort to use unilateral tacticswas precisely 
because Canada placed so much value on global governance that it was prepared to use 
any means possible to bring about an agreement based on order and universally accepted 
rules.175  Alexander Thompson largely accepts Coopers conclusions, and insists that 
Canada used direct action to protect [the turbot] while simultaneously taking advantage 
of the NAFO framework to legitimize its actions.176   
 While these authors provide valuable insight into Canadas behaviour in the 
Turbot War, they fail to explain sufficiently why Canada resorted to unilateral action.  
Donald Barry provides the most accurate depiction of Canadas conduct  as a series of 
unilateral actions aimed at reinvigorating the negotiation process with the EU.177  The 
evidence indicates that Canadas intention was basically to keep the issue of overfishing 
on the international agenda until Canada and the EU could negotiate new turbot quotas 
and strengthen the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) regulations.  In other 
words, Canadas unilateral actions can best be explained not only as a means of 
protecting territorial integrity, but also as a way of highlighting an issue until Canadian 
interests were secured.  
 
4.2 Societal Context Surrounding the Introduction of the CFPA Amendments 
 The societal forces that shaped Canadas actions in the Turbot War  included: a 
dramatic increase in world fishing catches; the decimation of Canadas fishing industry; 
disagreement over world fishing quotas, especially those set by the NAFO; and the 
ensuing conflict over the NAFO total allowable catch quota for turbot.   
During the 1980s there was a dramatic increase in the amount of fish caught 
throughout the world.   In 1989 the worlds fishing fleet caught more fish than had ever 
been recorded, with a total catch of over 86 million metric tonnes (MT).178  These catch 
                                                
175 Cooper, The Politics of Environmental Security, 142. 
176 Alexander Thompson, Canadian Foreign Policy and Straddling Stocks: Sustainability in an 
Interdependent World, Policy Studies Journal 28(1) (2000), 227. 
177 Donald Barry, The Canada-EU turbot war: Internal politics and transatlantic bargaining, International 
Journal 53(Spring 1998), 283. 
178 Jennifer Bailey, Hot Fish and (Bargaining) Chips, Journal of Peace Research 33(3) (1996), 258. 
  38 
 
 
levels were simply not sustainable, and fish stocks could not recuperate.  Eventually, fish 
stocks throughout various parts of the world were destroyed.  The international 
community recognized that for certain stocks to ever recover, strict limitations would 
have to be implemented.   
In an attempt to contain the fishing crisis, Canada implemented total allowable 
catch (TAC) quotas on certain types of groundfish.  In 1992, the Canadian government 
introduced a northern cod moratorium, and in 1994, it enacted severe limitations on the 
catch of other groundfish in Canadian waters.179  The sudden implementation of lower 
TAC quotas devastated the Canadian fishing industry, most severely affecting Atlantic 
Canada.  Large segments of Canadas fisheries had to be shut down and 40 000 fisheries 
workers in Atlantic Canada became unemployed, with 27 000 losing their jobs in 
Newfoundland alone.180   
While Canada struggled to implement tougher TAC quotas on the Canadian 
fishing industry, other states were not so concerned about the purported decimation of 
fishing stocks.  These states argued that the stocks would somehow recover and that 
record-breaking catches could still take place.  One of the greatest offenders of 
overfishing was Spain.  Spain had the largest fishing fleet in the EU, and Spanish trawlers 
fished off of every continent except for Antarctica and Australia.181  Spanish fishing boats 
were restricted from fishing in parts of Europe in 1994 and, in the past, had been arrested 
for illegal fishing off the coasts of South Africa, Ireland, and Britain.182  
 Still, Canada hoped that its new fishing quotas would lead other states to follow 
similar practices.  The cause of much of the overfishing in the North Atlantic was a lack 
of appropriate NAFO TAC quotas.  The NAFO set out the rules and regulations for those 
states fishing in the North Atlantic region as well as the TAC quotas for fish stocks found 
in the area. But the NAFO quotas were hotly contested by some member states.  Because 
the NAFO had no real regulatory powers, a country which felt strongly enough about 
their portion of a certain TAC quota, could choose to ignore the NAFO limit and behave 
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as it wished.  Ongoing EU opposition to the NAFO quotas began after Spain entered the 
EU in 1986.183  Foreign catches of the EU exceeded the TAC quota assigned by the 
NAFO in five of the six years prior to 1993.184 
In 1994, Canada restricted the TAC quota on another type of groundfish, the 
turbot.  Turbot, also known as the Greenland halibut, had historically attracted little 
attention from foreign fishermen off Canadas East coast, being located primarily inside 
Canadas 200-nautical mile zone.  During the early 1990s, however, the turbot began to 
migrate outside of the 200-nautical mile zone, where they were intensively overfished by 
Spanish and Portuguese ships.185  In the 1990s, the average Spanish turbot catch was 
approximately 50 000 MT per year, while Canada caught around 3 000 MT.186  In 1992 
alone, the EUs TAC turbot quota exceeded 22 600 MT, roughly 853% greater than the 
specified limits.187   
 At the next round of NAFO negotiations in September, 1994, Canada argued for a 
reduced turbot TAC quota.  Under the Canadian proposal, the quota would be limited to 
27 000 MT, with 16 500 MT allocated to Canada, 3 400 MT to the EU, 3 000 MT to 
Russia, 2 600 MT to Japan, with the rest divided among the remaining countries.188  The 
EU agreed to the 27 000 MT TAC quota, but proposed that the EU be given 16 800 MT 
and the remaining 10 200 MT divided among all other NAFO countries, including 
Canada.  Canada maintained that the EU proposal was unacceptable and in response, 
began lobbying other NAFO countries to support the Canadian quota.189  Eventually, 
enough countries were convinced and the Canadian proposal was adopted.   
 The adoption of the Canadian proposal shocked the EU and its Commissioner for 
Fisheries, Emma Bonino.190  Spain and Portugal declared that Canada should receive a 
smaller quota, as Canadian fishermen did not catch a significant portion of turbot, even if 
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the fish were mostly found within Canadas territorial sea.  On March 1, 1995, the EU 
unilaterally declared its own turbot TAC quota of 18 630 MT, an amount five times 
larger than that adopted in the NAFO proposal.191   
Canadas response to the NAFO proposal was largely shaped by Brian Tobin, 
then Minister of Fisheries and Oceans.  Tobin, a notorious member of the Liberal rat 
pack, served as a Member of Parliament since the 1980s and had been appointed 
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans on November 4, 1993.192  Tobin had a personal, 
longstanding relationship with Chrétien which gave him influence in Cabinet possessed 
by few other Ministers.  As both Minister of Fisheries and a native Newfoundlander, 
Tobin made it his priority to ensure that the fishing industry was a major consideration 
for the Liberal government.  He convinced Chrétien to include the issue of overfishing in 
the 1994 Speech from the Throne, which read as follows: The East Coast fishery, which 
has provided a livelihood to thousands of families in the Atlantic provinces and Quebec, 
confronts significant challenges due to the groundfish resource collapse. . .as such 
[Canada] will take the action required to ensure that foreign overfishing of East Coast 
stocks comes to an end.193  Clearly, Tobin wanted to guarantee that the issue of 
overfishing would stay on Canadas agenda. 
 Regardless of opposition from senior public servants in the Departments of 
Fisheries and Oceans, Foreign Affairs, and Defence, Tobin was adamant that a strong 
approach to overfishing be adopted.  No matter how strong the case, senior officials 
argued, Canada should not act unilaterally on the high seas.194  While there was 
disagreement in the Department of Fisheries and Oceans over the position Canada should 
adopt, officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) 
insisted that Fisheries and Oceans should not make decisions in areas related to the 
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conduct of Canadas foreign policy.  It was DFAIT that needed to be the lead Department 
on the overfishing issue.  The Department of National Defence had little inclination to get 
involved with Tobins initiative.  It did not want to provide any naval support and was 
only later convinced to monitor the situation.195 
With the backing of Prime Minister Chrétien, Tobin persuaded the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans to take the matter in hand.  He then outlined a number of policy 
strategies for the government to consider, including boarding more EU fishing vessels in 
the area, adding Spain to the list of states whose vessels were prohibited from fishing for 
straddling stocks on the Nose and Tail of the Grand Banks, and amending the CFPA to 
allow fisheries officers to halt vessels caught overfishing.196  Tobin favoured amending 
the CFPA as it would allow Canada to send a strong message on overfishing to the 
international community.  He also advocated that Canada remove fisheries disputes from 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court.197  His position received support from 
other senior Ministers including Herb Gray, Allan Rock, and David Collenette and most 
importantly, the Prime Minister.198     
 On May 14, 1994, Canada introduced amendments to the Coastal Fisheries 
Protection Act.  These amendments allowed the government to prohibit classes of 
foreign fishing vessels from fishing for straddling stocks in the NAFO Regulatory Area 
in contravention of certain conservation and management measures.199  Canada first 
used the legislation to target fishing trawlers flying flags of convenience in the area.  
Pursuing these ships served to warn EU vessels overfishing in the North Atlantic that 
their behaviour would not be tolerated.  As the EU ships remained unresponsive, Canada 
announced on March 3, 1995, that the new rules would apply to Spanish and Portuguese 
vessels fishing in international waters around the Grand Banks of Newfoundland200  
launching, with great occasion, the onset of the so-called Turbot War.  Shortly afterward, 
the new rules were applied to all vessels fishing in the area outright.201    
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4.3 Implementation of the CFPA Amendments 
 In introducing and enforcing the CFPA amendments, Canada declared that 
straddling stocks on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland [were] a major renewable world 
food source [that] provided a livelihood for centuries to fishers [and] that those stocks 
are threatened with extinction.202   The major amendment to the legislation was the 
addition of section 5.2, which stated that No person, being aboard a foreign fishing 
vessel of a prescribed class, shall in the NAFO Regulatory Area, fish or prepare to fish 
for a straddling stock in contravention of any of the prescribed conservation and 
management measures [of the NAFO]. 203  If vessels chose to violate the NAFO 
conservation and management measures, the legislation accorded fisheries protection 
officers to use force that is intended or is likely to disable a foreign fishing vessel, seize 
offending vessels, and arrest the vessels crew, if necessary.204   
Canada had originally hoped to reach an agreement with the EU through well-
publicised negotiations.  It was only after talks completely broke down that Canada 
moved unilaterally to stop overfishing in the North Atlantic region.   
Tobin was the Canadian governments primary spokesperson on the CFPA 
amendments. In attempting to justify Canadas position, Tobin would often draw 
parallels between the AWPPA and the CFPA amendments, arguing that in both cases 
Canada was forced to protect the environment.205  Prime Minister Chrétien also publicly 
discussed the matter: at a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Chrétien 
insisted that the Turbot War was evidence of Canadas sense of international duty.206  
Other declaratory statements released by the government stressed that Canada was forced 
to act as the guardian or steward of straddling stocks off the Grand Banks.207  To 
generate sympathy abroad for Canadas actions, the Canadian government launched a 
media campaign in Europe which depicted the negative effects of Spanish overfishing on 
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world stocks.208  Canada also used NAFO research to support its claims, for the NAFO 
had strong empirical data that demonstrated that Spain and Portugal were overfishing the 
turbot at the expense of Canada, Russia, Japan, and other NAFO members.209  To create 
greater public awareness in Canada, the Chrétien government recruited Canadian 
celebrities to publicly mention the issue, such as Don Cherry on Hockey Night in 
Canada.210 
While increasing public consciousness of the Turbot War, the Canadian 
government continued negotiating with the EU.  Canadian Ambassadors delivered letters 
to the heads of all EU states, as well as to the President of the EU.  The letters warned 
that unless the EU stopped fishing off Canadas Northeast coast, there would be serious 
consequences.  To deescalate the conflict, Canada also proposed a 60 day moratorium on 
fishing for turbot.211  In addition, Tobin briefed the Spanish Ambassador to Canada, Dr. 
Jose Luis Pardos, on Canadas position.  On the off-chance of reaching a last minute 
agreement, Chrétien continued to speak with both President Santer of the EU and Prime 
Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain throughout March of 1995.212  Once negotiations 
reached a complete impasse, Canada unilaterally enforced the CFPA amendments.   
Under the CFPA amendments, Canada forcibly seized the Estai on March 9, 1995, 
which had been fishing 45 nautical miles outside of Canadas jurisdiction.  Canadian 
authorities boarded the trawler, arrested its captain, and towed the seized ship to St. 
Johns, Newfoundland, where the captain was jailed.213  The warning shots fired during 
the seizure marked only the second time in recent years that gunfire had been employed 
by Canada to arrest a fishing vessel.214  Four Canadian patrol vessels also forced several 
Spanish trawlers to pull up their nets and flee on March 26, 1995.  During this incident, 
Canadian authorities attempted to board the Verde, but were unsuccessful.  Fisheries 
officers did succeed in cutting the nets of the trawler Pescamara Uno after the captain 
refused to let Canadian officials aboard.   
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Canadas unilateral implementation and enforcement of the CFPA amendments 
received a mixed reaction.  A crowd of several thousand people in Madrid flung eggs and 
dead fish at the Canadian Embassy.215  In retaliation to the seizure, Spain imposed visa 
requirements on Canadian visitors and initiated an action against Canada before the 
World Court.216  Spain also announced to the international news media that Canadas 
seizure of the Estai was an attempt to divert attention from internal problems plaguing the 
country, hinting at Canadas problems with Quebec separatists.217  On March 21, 1995, 
Spain sent the Vigia into the NAFO regulatory fishing area to guard ten Spanish fishing 
vessels.  The Vigia was authorized to use deadly force, if necessary, to protect the 
Spanish fleet.218   Canada was also sued for piracy and malicious prosecution by Capt. 
Enrique Davilla Gonzalez, of the Estai, and the company, Jose Pereira E Hijos, for 
unspecified damages.219 
At the outset of the event, the EU condemned Canadas actions as a breach of 
international law and impeded formal diplomatic interaction between Canada and 
Brussels.220  Though the EU officially denounced Canadas actions, it never imposed the 
retaliatory sanctions on Canada that Spain had requested.  John Major, then Prime 
Minister of Britain, spoke out on the incident, insisting that Canada is quite right to take 
a tough line on enforcement . . . But I hope in taking a tough line, she doesn't undermine 
her own good case which exists at present.221  Britain also announced that it would not 
back any move by the EU to impose sanctions against Canada.  Germany and the 
Netherlands were also reluctant to impose sanctions.222 
In Canada, the Chrétien government received much public support.  Chrétien and 
Tobin maintained high approval ratings throughout the incident.  An Angus Reid poll 
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showed that nine out of ten Canadians supported Canadas actions, with support 
surprisingly highest in the Prairie provinces, with 94% of the Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan populations supporting the initiative.223  Canadians wrote into newspapers 
announcing that they ha[d] never been more proud to be a Canadian, and urged fellow 
Canadians to support Canadas actions. 224  After the Estais capture, Tobin entered the 
House of Commons to a standing ovation from all Members of the House, including 
those from the Bloc Quebecois.225  Members encouraged Tobin to stand firm in 
protecting Canada's interests in this disputeconfident that Canadians stand with him226 
and commented on how the turbot [though] a miserable looking little fish rallied an 
entire nation.227  Parliamentarians urged Canadians to rally together: We stand shoulder 
to shoulder beside our fellow Canadians in Atlantic Canada. Together we must and we 
will save the fishery.228  
After the Estai was captured, negotiations between Canada and the EU resumed 
immediately.  To aid in depoliticizing the process, Canadian officials met with their 
counterparts from a variety of EU member states, including Britain, Spain and Portugal, 
as well as EU administrators.  As the EUs Commissioner for External Trade, Sir Leon 
Brittan put it, Even as the Brian and Emma show goes onwhile they are throwing dirt 
in public, we are negotiating in private.229  As a result, poor relations between Bonino 
and Tobin had little impact on negotiations. 
  Finally, an agreement was struck between Canada and the EU on April 16, 1995.  
Canada and the EU agreed to keep the 27 000 MT TAC turbot limit for 1995, but both 
would now receive a 10 000 MT TAC quota.  Canada arranged to drop all charges 
against the Spanish crew of the Estai and release the ship from custody.  In return, the EU 
acceded to implementing a number of conservation and surveillance measures at the 
NAFO.  New measures included improvements to inspection procedures, tougher 
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penalties for infringements, more detailed catch reports to increase transparency, an 
increase in the minimum retention size of turbot to 30 centimetres, and a pilot project to 
observe all fishing vessels in the area, with 35% of these ships tracked by satellite.230 
Later that spring, the agreement between Canada and the EU was put to the test.  
On April 28, 1995, Canadian officials received permission from Ottawa to board the 
Spanish trawler, the Mayi Cuatro.  Officials inspected the boat and then released a net 
determined to be illegal.  EU inspectors reviewed the evidence seized by Canadian 
officials and, concurring with their judgement, ordered the Mayi Cuatro to return to 
port.231   
After the successful implementation of the Canada-EU agreement, Canada and 
the EU continued working together to strengthen world fishing regulations.  On August 4, 
1995, at the United Nations Conference on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 
Canada and the EU, along with other member states, crafted provisions which provide 
officials with the power to board foreign-flag vessels in international waters upon 
suspicion of illegal activity.232  Tobin believed that this new convention could provide 
Canada the means to end foreign overfishing permanently.233  Later, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations passed an agreement which devolves 
more power to regional organizations, so they can effectively enforce regulations.234   
 
4.4 Analysis of the Implementation of the CFPA Amendments 
 Most commentators agree that the enforcement of the CFPA amendments was not 
meant as an attack on international law.  Instead Canadas actions are characterized as a 
                                                
230 See Text of Minutes, Treaties and Agreements: Canada-European Community: Agreed Minute 
on the Conservation and Management of Fish Stocks, International Legal Materials 34(5) (September 
1995), 1262-1271.  See also NAFO, Meetings Proceedings of the General Council and Fisheries 
Commission for 1995, (Dartmouth, Nova Scotia: NAFO Headquarters, 1996), 152 as quoted in Thompson, 
Canadian Foreign Policy and Straddling Stocks, 228 and McDorman, Canadas Aggressive Fisheries 
Actions, 27. 
231 Schaefer, The Turbot War, 442. 
232 Brian Tobin as quoted in Canada: Fisheries Minister Welcomes UN Consensus, Reuter Textline 
Agency Europe, 10 August 1995 as quoted in Schaefer, The Turbot War, 443.  For a copy of the 
agreement see http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.htm.   
233 Schaefer, The Turbot War, 443. 
234 This is known as the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas.  See Sneyd, Fighting over Fish, 17.  A copy 
of the agreement is available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/003/x3130m/x3130m00.htm.  
  47 
 
 
state taking an aggressive stance for a justifiable cause.235  Clearly, Canadas own 
domestic policies, together with those of other states, contributed to the decimation of the 
worlds fishing stocks.  Yet once the Canadian government realized that many fish stocks 
were in jeopardy, it drastically reduced catch limits.  When other states were unwilling to 
apply similar measures, Canada enforced the CFPA amendments to communicate to the 
international community and, in particular, to other members of the NAFO, that Canada 
would not stand by and be the only country to suffer from the decimation of world fishing 
stocks.  
Canadas unilateral actions can be seen as a deliberate act to preserve Canadas 
territorial integrity.  As the turbot was a migratory fish stock traditionally found within 
Canadas territorial sea, the Canadian government wanted to preserve the resources found 
within this boundary.  Accordingly, Gotliebs characterization of this instance of 
unilateralism is correct.  What he fails to take into account is that Canada acted 
unilaterally within a multilateral framework.  Its goal was to keep the issue of overfishing 
on the international agenda long enough to negotiate a suitable agreement.  As Tobin 
stated, Mr. Speaker, we have taken rather dramatic measures so far, but our goal is to 
find a solution through negotiation.236 
Canada clearly had a preference for negotiation.  Even after numerous failed 
attempts to reach a suitable agreement, including the rejection of the Canadian-written 
NAFO TAC turbot quota, Canada persisted in negotiating with the EU.  Once discussions 
reached an impasse, the Canadian government attempted to reinvigorate the negotiation 
process.  Chrétien even called President Santer to attempt last minute negotiations before 
Canada resorted to enforcing the CFPA amendments.237   
Once Canada had begun to enforce its policy, it quickly returned to discussions 
with the EU.  After these deliberations were stalled by Spain, Canada moved two navy 
gunboats, the frigate Gatineau and the destroyer Nipigon, into the area.  Tobin then gave 
a television interview on CTV where he confirmed that Canada had not ruled out the 
possibility of using further force, but actually that, it had been ruled in.  These 
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measures were meant to prevent Spain from completely stalling the negotiation process.  
Finally, after an emergency meeting in Brussels, the EU ratified the agreement.238  Which 
is to support Donald Barrys contention that the Turbot War can be understood as a series 
of unilateral actions aimed at reinvigorating the negotiation process with the EU.239  As 
Tobin stated, We much prefer to talk. We much prefer to negotiate. We will go to the 
nth degree to settle our differences by agreement. However we warn all those who are 
listening that we will not sit and talk while the last fish is being caught.240 
Canadas unilateral actions also served other purposes.  It advanced international 
acceptance of the precautionary principle, where states recognize that they have a duty to 
protect the environment from the unknown.241  In this sense, Canada was able to further 
the process of progressive legal developments.242  Furthermore, its actions led to 
increased commitment by other members of the international community to negotiate 
more stringent international limits on fishing and regulatory measures.  Accordingly, 
Canadas actions could aid in the development of a body of law [that would actually] 
eliminate the need for gunboat diplomacy.243  
It is also likely that Canadas actions provided impetus for the negotiation of other 
stalled fishing agreements.  Allen Springer maintains that it was because of Canadas 
strong stance during the Turbot War that the US quickly restarted discussions on the 
Pacific salmon dispute: Canada's willingness to take tough unilateral action against 
Spain and the degree of support that position ultimately attracted both in Canada and 
abroad, including [in] the U.S., likely affected American perceptions of the value of a 
negotiated solution.244  Only five months after the Turbot War, Canada and the US 
appointed Christopher Beeby, New Zealand's former ambassador to France, to mediate 
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the salmon dispute.  Both states committed themselves to negotiating an agreement, 
regardless the problems that had plagued earlier discussions.245 
In the case of the CFPA amendments, there is not sufficient evidence to prove that 
Canada acted in a unilateral manner primarily to protect the environment.246  Though 
Canadas unilateral actions did secure the survival of the turbot, and it did advance ideas 
in the international community that would advance environmental safeguards, its primary 
concern was protecting the resource for fishing purposes.  Fish stocks had been 
decimated to the point that it was questionable if certain species would ever recover.  It 
was only by securing a level of fish stocks that Canada could help to save the Atlantic 




 As this chapter has demonstrated, the CFPA amendments are a clear illustration 
of Canadas willingness to act in a unilateral manner for the purposes of maintaining 
territorial integrity  accordingly, supporting Gotliebs claim.  What Gotliebs analysis 
overlooks is that Canadas unilateral actions must also be recognized within a multilateral 
framework, where Canada resorted to unilateralism only when negotiations between 
Canada and the EU were at a standstill.  Furthermore, Canadas actions were consistent 
with international norms and advanced new areas of international law.  In this sense, 
Canadas actions primarily served to reinvigorate the negotiation process within a 
multilateral setting. 
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Under at least four prime ministers  St. Laurent, Pearson, Trudeau and 
Mulroney  Canadians have asserted unilateral claims to sovereignty or 
jurisdiction over vast Maritime zonesAll these actions, including Canadas 
questionable legal behaviour on the high seas during the turbot war, and our 
renouncing of recourse to the rule of law whenever we could be challenged, 
were greeted favourably by Canadian public opinion  sometimes with wild 
acclaim.  When it comes to asserting our own territoriality based on national 
interests, Canadian unilateralism has been consistent, aggressive and the 
dominant strategy for over half a century.  It cannot properly be seen as 




If we agree with Allan Gotliebs claim that, in certain instances, Canada has a 
propensity to act unilaterally in the world, what conclusions can we draw about the 
reasons why it does?  Even if the instances of unilateral action have been infrequent, they 
can draw attention to an instinctual way in which Canada conducts its foreign policy.248 
They also serve to remind us that unilateral action by state actors need not be viewed in a 
negative light, as it often is.  
Though the three case studies examined in this thesis are examples of Canadian 
unilateralism, they are not sufficient evidence to demonstrate that unilateralism is an 
inherent Canadian preference.  Gotlieb argues that in all three instances, including the 
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 1970, the Territorial Seas and Geographic 
Coordinates (Area7) Order, 1985 and the Turbot War, 1995, Canada acted unilaterally to 
protect its territorial sovereignty.  He insists these instances were not unique and that 
Canada has a long history of acting unilaterally in the international system. The cases 
cannot be characterized as minor deviations from the true path of multilateralism 249 
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and reinforce the point that Canada must adopt a reality-based foreign policy rather than 
one based on utopianism, millenarianism, and visionary crusades.250  But the evidence 
found raises questions about Gotliebs argument. It does not demonstrate clearly that 
Canada has a preference for acting unilaterally to protect its territory; rather its unilateral 
actions are better described as a means toward the achievement of the greater goal of 
multilateralism. Gotlieb is correct in a sense: Canada was concerned about protecting its 
territorial sovereiginty. But what he misses is that protecting territorial sovereignty is not 
an achievable goal for a small power like Canada; it cannot make its claims stick. What 
Canada was doing rather, through its unilateral initiatives, was keeping issues such as 
Arctic jurisdiction and the regulation of fisheries alive for further discussion at the 
multilateral level.  Put another way, its unilateral actions were always conceived and 
viewed within a framework of multilateralism.  Each of the three cases demonstrates that 
Canada unilaterally implemented or enforced legislation in order to restart negotiations 
on either a multilateral or even a bilateral basis. 
Unilateralism is often defined in pejorative terms.  In the international community 
it is often considered tantamount to a dirty word, though it is paradoxically both 
absolutely prohibited and protected by the UN Charter.251  On the other hand, 
multilateralism has positive connotations as it implies the achievement of consensus and 
cooperation among international actors.  It is critical, however, that unilateralism and 
multilateralism not be considered independent concepts.  In a globalized world, it is 
almost impossible for states to act completely independently or without consulting one 
another.  Instead, it is more useful to think of unilateralism and multilateralism as falling 
on a continuum, where decisions may be classified as more one than the other.252  It is 
also important to note that there are other options for states outside of unilateralism and 
multilateralism.  States may attempt to work bilaterally or may choose to not take any 
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action.  Unilateralism, as it has been understood in this thesis, thus refers to one state 
proceed[ing] independently, on its own authority, with minimal involvement by other 
states in the resulting decision or action.253  It occurs when a state acts on its own with 
or without consulting other international players and where their positions or opinions 
may or may not be taken into account.  
Similarly, there has been no consensus on how multilateralism should be 
understood.254  One of the best definitions comes from John Gerard Ruggie who 
recognizes that multilateralism coordinates interaction between states, within a certain 
framework to order these relations.255  As a result, multilateralism determines what 
appropriate state conduct is, regardless of the particular context or actors involved.256  
Because multilateralism is understood to be built upon cooperation and the achievement 
of consensus at some level, it carries an international legitimacy not enjoyed by other 
means.257   
Yet the legitimacy of multilateralism has been recently thrown into question.  
States will act within a multilateral framework but still adhere to their own idea of what is 
acceptable behaviour and show a concern often only for their own benefit from 
multilateral relationships. For this reason, or because of what John Van Oudenaren calls 
dysfunctional multilateralism, other states, who might otherwise have a multilateral 
orientation, sometimes turn to unilateralism in order to defend their interests.258  Here, 
they see a choice not between unilateralism and multilateralism but in fact between 
unilateralism and inaction.259  Yet, in certain instances, their unilateral actions will be an 
attempt to lead or initiate change, proceeding in the hope of influencing other states to 
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follow with similar behaviour.260  In other words, unilateralism is still ultimately 
predicated on the survival, indeed the success, of a multilateral framework. 
There is substantial evidence from the three cases investigated in this thesis to 
show that they are examples of unilateralism pursued for the purpose of initiating change 
as described above.  In the case of the AWPPA, Canada acted unilaterally to introduce 
regulations for pollution prevention in the Arctic.  After lengthy negotiations with the US, 
the Canadian government came to the realization that no agreement was possible over the 
territorial status of the Northwest Passage.  Rather than taking a position that these 
northern waters were recognized as an international strait, Ottawa sought to reaffirm its 
sovereignty over the territory through the AWPPA.  Under the Act, Canada, viewing 
itself as a custodian of the North, created a 100-mile pollution prevention zone.  Ships 
transiting the Northwest Passage within this jurisdiction were now required to follow 
regulations outlined by the Canadian government and could be searched by pollution 
prevention officers working in the area.  As Gotlieb suggests, it was through the 
unilateral implementation of the AWPPA that Canada was able to protect its territorial 
sovereignty by functionally regulating the area. 
But while Canada may have acted unilaterally to protect its territorial sovereignty 
in the case of the AWPPA, its larger purpose was to keep an issue of national importance 
for Canada on the multilateral agenda.  The Canadian government was aware that 
claiming sovereignty over the Northwest Passage might not be accepted by the 
international community.  But it understood that the legislation was in harmony with 
evolving international norms and values.  Indeed its unilateral initiative enshrined 
principles that would later become part of international law in Article 234 of the Law of 
the Sea Convention, which gave coastal states the right to adopt and enforce laws for the 
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered 
areas.261 
Similarly, the drawing of straight baselines under the TSGCO provides evidence 
that Canada is willing to act unilaterally, although for reasons beyond a desire to affirm 
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territorial sovereignty. Under the TSGCO, Canada drew baselines around both the islands 
and the surrounding waters of the Arctic archipelago.  As the 100-mile pollution 
prevention zone, the 200-mile exclusive economic zone, and the 12-mile territorial sea, 
would then be measured from these baselines, the TSGCO effectively enclosed the 
Northwest Passage within Canadas jurisdiction.   
But while the TSGCO drew straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago, 
Canadas unilateral behaviour was punctuated by a return to multilateralism.  The 
Canadian government was quite aware that the US was unwilling to move from its 
position on the Northwest Passage and discussions between Canada and the US on the 
territorial sea quickly reached an impasse.  Knowing that the US was unlikely to accept 
its declaration of straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago, Ottawa offered to enter 
into immediate negotiations with the US after introducing the TSGCO.  This allowed 
Canada to once again keep an issue of national importance, on the bilateral and 
multilateral agenda. Negotiations soon began between the two countries which led to the 
signing of the Canada-US Arctic Cooperation Agreement, furthering US recognition of 
Canadian jurisdiction over the Arctic.  
Finally, the Turbot War illustrates similar behaviour and similar goals on the part 
of Canada in pursuing unilateral action.  The major difference with the Turbot War, 
compared to the AWPPA and the TSGCO, is that Canada did not act simply to assert 
jurisdiction over territory.  Instead, it acted to protect resources (namely the turbot) found 
within its territorial sea.  It did so by amending the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act to 
provide Canadian fisheries officers with the power to board or forcibly stop ships 
suspected of violating NAFO regulations or catch limits.  On March 9, 1995, Canada 
enforced these amendments by forcibly seizing the Spanish fishing trawler the Estai.  
After negotiations between Canada and the EU to create a new agreement fell apart, 
Canada forced other Spanish fishing trawlers, including the Verde and the Pescamara 
Uno, to flee the area after cutting fishing nets on nearby ships.   
But again, although Canada unilaterally enforced amendments to the CFPA to 
protect its territoriality, there is another explanation for its behaviour.  Canada had 
struggled with the consequences of overfishing for decades.  When it became apparent 
that other countries were unwilling to seriously address the issue, Ottawa chose to move 
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unilaterally to keep the issue of overfishing on the international agenda.  Protecting the 
turbot was important to Canada, but it was not the primary concern.  It provided Canada 
with the opportunity to demonstrate the importance of new regulations to end overfishing, 
which would later be implemented by the international community.  In the end, Canada 
and the EU were able to negotiate a new agreement, which changed the total allowable 
catch quota for turbot, created more stringent NAFO regulations, and provided the NAFO 
with further regulatory powers.  Canada and the EU subsequently encouraged stronger 
fishing regulations in other areas.  In particular, they worked to approve firmer 
regulations at the Law of the Sea Convention to devolve further regulatory power to 
regional organizations.  
The three cases studied in this thesis prove that, as Gotlieb has said, Canada is 
willing to act unilaterally to protect its territorial sovereignty.  Canadas unilateral acts in 
these cases are consistent with the definition offered by Daniel Bodansky, where Canada 
proceed[ed] independently, on its own authority, with minimal involvement by other 
states in the resulting decision or action.262  Though Canada consulted other states 
before implementing the AWPPA and the CFPA amendments, it was still the primary 
actor that executed the legislation, against the wishes of the US and the EU, respectively.  
In the case of the TSGCO, Canada had limited consultations with other states prior to 
implementing the legislation.  Instead, Canadian officials ensured the Mulroney 
government that the legislation was consistent with current norms and values found in the 
international community, as evidenced by recent decisions at the World Court.   
Although Gotliebs characterization of Canada as a unilateral actor is correct, it is 
important to note that Canada had a larger purpose in mind.  The cases do not provide 
sufficient evidence that Canada has a strong preference to act unilaterally in the name of 
national interests.  What Gotliebs analysis overlooks is that Canada quickly returned to 
acting multilaterally.  All three cases provide evidence that after Canada unilaterally 
implemented legislation it quickly moved to restart multilateral or bilateral negotiations.  
It also worked to garner support from other members of the international community for 
the legislation it had implemented.  Above all, Canada was concerned with keeping 
issues, such as jurisdiction over the Northwest Passage and rights to certain TAC fishing 
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quotas, on the multilateral agenda.  It was quite aware that it did not have the resources or 
the status in the international community to avoid challenges to its claims.  Instead, its 
declarations served primarily to garner the attention of the international community.  
Unable to ignore Canadas actions, other states were forced to negotiate an agreement 
more acceptable to Canada.  Where these allies were unwilling to negotiate, such as the 
US in the AWPPA, Canadas declarations and later consultations with the international 
community led other states to accept the principles promoted by Canada until these ideas 
were enacted in international law. 
Gotlieb fails to acknowledge that Canadas unilateral actions succeeded in 
advancing the multilateral and global agenda  by fostering new developments in 
international law.  Canada had no way to enforce its claims, except through acquiring 
international legitimacy.  Acting in harmony with evolving norms in the international 
community and international law, afforded Canada, a state with limited resources, the 
credibility it needed to act unilaterally.  This in turn allowed it to protect its interests in 
the face of international opposition.  This is precisely what Franklyn Griffiths means 
when he describes Canadas approach to questions of territorial sovereignty as one 
involving unilateral action first and then subsequently efforts to gather multilateral 
support.263  It was a functional approach that allowed Canada to gain support for 
sovereignty with the assistance of other states.     
Canadas intention in the AWPPA was clearly to advance international law.  In a 
letter sent to the United Nations in which Canada reserved its decision from the World 
Court, the Canadian government wrote that State practice, or unilateral action by a state, 
has always been accepted as one of the ways of developing international law.264  
Through the AWPPA, Canada exercised the right of coastal states to protect its 
environment from pollution, which was later protected by Article 234 of the Law of the 
Sea Convention.   
The case of the TSGCO also illustrates an attempt by Canada to change 
international law.  Its decision to remove its 1970 reservation over acceptance of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court, as well as the decision to forge ahead 
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with the drawing of straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago, was consistent with 
reinforcing new developments in international law.  These actions were compatible with 
recent decisions at the World Court that recognized the right of states with irregular coast 
lines to draw straight baselines around these areas.   
The Turbot War is a third example of Canada acting unilaterally for the larger 
purpose of developing principles in international law.  Because of Canadas actions, 
Canada and the EU were able to negotiate stronger regulations for the NAFO.  The 
principles behind these regulations were later adopted more widely by the international 
community at UN Conferences on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, where 
states increased the powers of regulatory bodies.  Furthermore, Canadas behaviour 
during the Turbot War advanced an idea in international law known as the precautionary 
principle, where states recognize a duty to protect the environment from the unknown. 
Overall, Canadas unilateral behaviour focused more on advancing Canadian 
national interests within an acceptable multilateral or international framework than acting 
unilaterally to defend its territory.  Canadians resorted to unilateralism only because a 
suitable agreement that would recognize Canadas national interests could not be reached.  
In all three cases, Canada was involved in extensive negotiations, and it was only after 
negotiations proved futile that it acted unilaterally to restart discussions by creating a 
sense of urgency.  Unilateralism proved to be an effective method of restarting stalled 
negotiations.  Afterwards, Canada quickly returned to operating within a multilateral 
framework.    
Accordingly, Canadas actions in these three case studies prove that smaller 
powers can use unilateralism effectively.  Indeed had Canada not acted unilaterally, the 
issues in question might have been passed over by the international community.  Though 
Canada could not enforce its unilateral claims, it gathered support from the international 
community until its positions obtained backing in international law.  This is to say, 
Canada, like other smaller states in the world, can act as a leader on certain international 
issues if it has support within the international community to provide legitimacy for its 
initiatives.  Support for Canadas unilateral actions may also have been facilitated by the 
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nature of Canadas interests.  Canadas actions were consistent with international norms, 
allowing Canada to garner support from other states who agreed with these principles.     
 Though Gotlieb draws attention to an important feature of Canadian foreign 
policy with his description of Canada as a unilateral actor, the problem is that there 
remains a clear lack of understanding of what unilateralism is by both practitioners of 
Canadian foreign policy and the academic community.  While questioning the pejorative 
characterization of unilateralism, Gotlieb discounts the meliorative nature of 
multilateralism.  He fails to recognize that Canadas punctuated acts of unilateralism 
happen within a multilateral framework, where Canada sometimes acts unilaterally in the 
face of dysfunctional multilateralism.  In the end, Canada quickly returns to 
multilateralism once its unilateral actions have created enough awareness for the issue in 
the international community. 
 Further research should focus on changing the limited understanding of both 
unilateralism and multilateralism in this regard.  Unilateralism does have its place: it is a 
method used by larger and smaller powers alike in the multilateral and international 
system.  It can no longer be defined in such a pejorative manner and instead must be seen 
as a legitimate way for smaller powers (with significant support) to act in the 
international community.  States may on occasion act unilaterally if they do so within a 
framework of internationally accepted norms and principles and have legitimacy within 
the international community.  Its legitimacy as a method cannot be underrated, especially 
in the face of dysfunctional multilateralism.   
 Additional research might also be conducted on how and why unilateralism is a 
viable option not only for Canada, but for other smaller powers to exercise.  What are the 
factors that cause smaller powers to act unilaterally?  Is it only questions of sovereignty 
that prompt such action or are there other issues such as global security threats or human 
security issues, that will force smaller powers to act unilaterally?  Is there evidence to 
suggest smaller powers undertake unilateral initiatives due to public support or because 
of the strength of the countrys leader?  What are the factors that allow smaller powers to 
succeed at unilateralism?  The three cases in the thesis provide evidence that suggests that 
for smaller powers to undertake successful unilateral initiatives they must have the ability 
to garner support from the international community.  In the end, how effective do these 
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initiatives actually turn out to be?  All three cases advanced areas of international law, but 
are these laws actually followed in the international community?   
Further research in these areas may contribute to a more sophisticated 
understanding of unilateralism by policy makers and members of the international 
community.  Unilateralism may be considered a viable option for smaller powers, and 
major powers may not face immediate condemnation because they choose to act 
unilaterally.   
This thesis demonstrates that Canadas willingness to act unilaterally in areas of 
national importance allowed it to effectively keep issues on the multilateral and 
international agenda.  These acts of unilateralism within a multilateral framework 
allowed Canada to continue negotiations until suitable solutions were reached.  By 
strategically using unilateralism, Canada initiated new developments and then gathered 
support from the international community.  As a result, it could act in areas of national 
importance as a world leader. 
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